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Banks’ Specialization in Short- 
Term Commercial Lending: 
New England in the Nineteenth Century 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
In their relations with the external world, banks face two basic kinds of infor- 
mation problems: ascertaining the creditworthiness of  those to whom they 
loan their funds, and convincing those from whom they obtain funds of their 
own creditworthiness. This essay uses the historical experience of banks in 
nineteenth-century New England to explore the interaction between these two 
kinds of  information problems and the policies bankers adopted in granting 
loans. I argue that as credit markets grew increasingly large and impersonal 
over the course of the century, bankers found it more and more difficult to 
evaluate the financial standing of potential borrowers and also to inform de- 
positors and investors about their own performance. These new difficulties 
forced banks to alter the way in which they conducted their business and, as a 
consequence, the role they played in the larger economy. Whereas in the early 
part of the century, banks had loaned funds for a variety of purposes, including 
investments in fixed capital, by the end of the century they mainly specialized 
in the business of short-term commercial and brokers’ loans, leaving loans for 
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long-term purposes to other types of  intermediaries. Although banks contin- 
ued to support capital formation by granting credit to brokers on the collateral 
of stocks and bonds, they no longer had any direct relationship with the firms 
that issued the securities. As a result,  as banking operations became more 
specialized, banks lost their ability to monitor and influence the businesses 
upon whose prosperity the value of their portfolios depended. 
5.1  Insider Lending by Early-Nineteenth-Century  Banks 
In  order to analyze this process of  transformation, one must understand 
how banks functioned in the first half of the nineteenth century. Compared to 
their modem counterparts, the operations of  early banks were very simple, 
and bank management usually consisted of  only a few salaried employees. 
The largest institutions might be staffed by a cashier, several tellers and clerks, 
and perhaps a bookkeeper; the smallest might employ only a cashier. But re- 
gardless of size and number of employees, the real locus of power in an early- 
nineteenth-century bank was its board of  directors, one of  whose members 
served as president. Committees of directors supervised the day-to-day busi- 
ness of the bank, often involving themselves in minute operational details. 
More important, the directors were responsible for determining the bank’s 
lending policy: they decided how much money the bank could afford to loan 
and which borrowers were deserving of funds.’ 
If one examines the lending policies pursued by these directors, one discov- 
ers that early banks differed from modern institutions in a very striking way: 
the bulk of their loans went to directors or to other insiders. For example, at 
the Pawtuxet Bank (chartered in Warwick, Rhode Island, in 1814), a list of 
notes discounted from the early 1840s shows that fully 53 percent (by value) 
belonged to James Rhodes, the partnership J. Rhodes and Sons, or various 
manufacturing enterprises  associated  with  the  partnership  of  C.  and  W. 
Rhodes. James Rhodes was both president and a director of the bank until his 
death in 1841, and his brothers, Christopher and William (the principals of C. 
and W.  Rhodes), also served from time to time as directors, with Christopher 
succeeding to  the  presidency upon  James’s death.  Other  members  of  the 
bank’s board of directors absorbed an additional 16 percent of the loans.* Sim- 
ilarly, at the Wakefield (Rhode Island) Bank, chartered in 1834, the obliga- 
tions of  two local manufacturers, Samuel Rodman (a director) and Isaac P. 
Hazard (a kinsman of Rodman and several other directors), accounted for 54 
1. This generalization is based on my reading of the records that are extant for a number of 
early banks in Massachusetts  and Rhode Island (see also Redlich 1947, 18-20). 
2. These totals probably understate the proportion of  notes discounted for the benefit of insid- 
ers, because they are based on information about promisors only. The names of endorsers were 
not included in the records (Directors’ and Stockholders’  Minute Book, 1815-85,  Pawtuxet Bank, 
Rhode Island Historical Society Manuscript Collections, Rhode Island Historical Society Library, 
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percent of  the discounts outstanding as of  1 March  1845. Notes involving 
members of the three interrelated families that controlled the bank (the Rod- 
mans, Hazards, and Robinsons) accounted altogether for 84 percent of  the 
bank’s total loans. 
Investigating the situation in late  1836, Rhode Island’s banking commis- 
sioners found that insider lending was a widespread phenomenon. “At two of 
the [Providence] banks lately visited,” they reported, “one half of the whole 
amount respectively loaned by them, was discounted for the accommodation 
of  the directors,  and of  copartnerships of  which they were members. At  a 
third, three-fifths of the aggregate loans went into similar hands.” Indeed, as 
a result of their investigation the commissioners were forced to conclude that 
the practice of insider lending had become so pervasive that banks were “to a 
considerable extent mere engines to supply the directors with m~ney.”~ 
New  Hampshire’s  bank  commissioners  arrived  at  similar  conclusions 
(Smith 1967, 233-34),  as did their counterparts in neighboring Massachu- 
setts. In  1838, for instance, the Massachusetts state legislature passed a law 
offering special privileges to any bank that would restrict its loans to directors 
to 30 percent of  its capital stock, unless  shareholders expressly authorized 
higher limits. Of  the state’s nearly  120 banks only 29 (including only 2 in 
Boston) accepted this condition. As for the rest, upon examining their books 
the  commissioners noted,  “The liabilities of  the  directors in  most  of  the 
Banks, which have not accepted the Act, are above the limits established by 
the law” (Massachusetts, General Court 1839, 13-14).  Nor  were regulators 
alone  in  this  assessment;  bankers  themselves admitted that  directors  fre- 
quently  turned to  their  own  institutions for loans.  Indeed,  Boston banker 
Thomas E. Cary attempted to justify the practice in 1845: “It would certainly 
be advisable that bank directors should be men of property, retired from busi- 
ness, who never wish to borrow money. But this cannot be. Such men can but 
rarely be induced to trouble themselves with engagements of this nature, and 
the duty of lending from the bank is left to be performed, in most cases, by 
those who are borrowers themselves” (Cary 1845, 13)  .5 
3. These figures, which include appearances in the records as both principals and endorsers, are 
probably underestimations,  because sloppy (or perhaps deceptive) bookkeeping practices appear 
to have hidden additional loans to these individuals (Bill Book A, Wakefield Bank, Rhode Island 
Historical Society Manuscript Collections).  See also Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 
1834-65,  Wakefield Bank,  Fleet  National  Bank Archives,  Fleet  National  Bank, Slater Trust 
Branch, Pawtucket, RI; and Robinson (1895). 
4. Rhode Island, General Assembly, Acrs andResolves (January 1837), 89-92. 
5. All of  the New England states at some point required banks to report to the legislature the 
percentage of their discounts that went to directors, but these figures were typically so understated 
as to be virtually useless as indicators of  the extent of  insider lending.  In the first place, vague 
reporting requirements and a lack of standardized accounting procedures allowed banks consider- 
able leeway in compiling their reports. Second, the totals did not include loans to relatives or 
business associates of  directors. Nor did they include loans to corporations with which the direc- 
tors were connected. As a consequence, there was often a large discrepancy between the amount 
of  loans a bank officially reported  to the legislature and the extent of  insider lending actually 
indicated by  its books. In 1828, for example, the Eagle Bank of  Bristol reported to the Rhode 164  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
5.2  Banks as Vehicles for the Accumulation of  Capital 
It might be hypothesized that the prevalence of insider lending in the early- 
nineteenth-century economy was a consequence of the scarcity and poor qual- 
ity of economic information, that because of the difficulties inherent in obtain- 
ing reliable data about the financial standing of strangers, bankers restricted 
their lending to borrowers whose businesses they knew well-their  own and 
those of close relatives and associates.  As  we shall see, this  argument  has 
some validity, but it is unlikely that it completely explains the practice. Many 
of the banks with concentrated loan portfolios were located in small country 
towns, where lenders would have been familiar with the business standing of 
most would-be borrowers-outsiders  as well as insiders. That some of these 
local, outside borrowers might also be deserving of credit is suggested by the 
records of the Sutton Bank in southern Massachusetts, one of the few cases I 
have found for which complete lists of applicants for loans (as opposed to just 
lists of recipients) are extant. In March  1829, for example, the bank received 
applications for discounts totaling $10,210.36, but approved only a quarter of 
that amount. Markings on the records indicate that most of the rest of the notes 
were denied not for lack of creditworthiness,  but instead were “laid over” for 
lack of  funds.  At the same time, members of  the family that controlled the 
bank (the Wilkinsons) owed more than $80,000, nearly 90 percent of its out- 
standing loans. The bank lacked funds to lend to others in the community for 
the  simple reason that the  Wilkinsons had  already absorbed most of  its re- 
sources. 
A more powerful explanation for the prevalence of insider lending was the 
general scarcity of credit in this capital-poor economy, a scarcity that induced 
bank  directors  to take  advantage of  their  positions  of  authority  to channel 
funds into their own enterprises.  Evidence that has survived from several of 
the region’s pioneering banks indicates that their early years were fraught with 
conflict, as directors with a broad sense of public purpose struggled for con- 
trol  against those  seeking to make personal use of  the  institutions.  For ex- 
ample, at the Massachusetts  Bank, chartered in  1784 as the first bank in the 
Island legislature that it had loaned 18 percent of  its funds to directors, yet an examination of  its 
records for this period shows that directors were principals on 30 percent (by value) of the notes it 
discounted, and endorsers on another 25 percent. The Pawtuxet Bank’s report to the general as- 
sembly in 1842 indicated that its loans to directors amounted to a mere 6 percent of the total, while 
the Wakefield  Bank’s report for  1845 showed directors receiving only  14 percent of  the loans. 
Similarly, at approximately  the same time as Rhode Island’s bank commissioners were finding 
extensive evidence of  insider lending, the maximum proportion of  loans to directors reported in 
the official bank returns was 35  percent (Draw Account Book, Eagle Bank, Fleet National Bank 
Archives; Rhode Island, General Assembly, Acfs and Resolves, May  1828, 37a; May 1837, 42a; 
June  1842, 16a; and October 1845, 40a). Additional evidence on insider lending is scattered 
throughout this article. See also Lamoreaux (1986) and Beveridge (1985). 
6. Applications for Discount,  1828-30,  Sutton Bank, MSS 781, Baker Library, Harvard Uni- 
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region, a group of the original proprietors used their influence to borrow ex- 
tensively from the bank and to insist that their loans be renewed at will. By 
the summer of  1785, this behavior had left the bank short of funds,  and a 
reform coalition headed by William Phillips forced the recalcitrant borrowers 
to sell their stock and withdraw from the institution. Elected president of the 
bank the next year, Phillips initiated a series of policy changes that prohibited 
renewals and limited the amounts that any one individual could borrow. The 
result of these changes can be seen in a list of the bank’s discounts for March 
1788. By  that time only about  17  percent of  total loans (by value) went to 
directors or others with the same last name. Similarly, by  1792 the bank was 
able to report to the state that its loans to stockholders amounted to a mere 
23  percent  of  capital stock (and  therefore even  less of  total  loans).  Most 
of  its borrowers, the bank  claimed,  were “opulent Merchants of  extensive 
business and credit, but a small part of whose property is in the funds of the 
Bank.”’ 
By contrast, in the case of the Providence Bank (chartered in  1791 as the 
first bank in Rhode Island), the reformers seem to have lost out. Discount 
records for 1793 and 1798 show the bank’s directors getting 75 to 80 percent 
of  the loans,  despite the efforts of  Moses Brown,  the self-appointed con- 
science of the directors.8 As late as 181  1 Brown was still criticizing the bank’s 
other directors, decrying their laxity in collecting past-due debts from, and 
granting overdrafts to, themselves, and also complaining about their reluc- 
tance to let him see the bank’s books: “I have calld on the Officers a number 
of  Times Since to know  if  the Accts were ready for My  Examination. the 
period has never yet Arived, the reason Suggested for the Delay by the Offi- 
cers was their not having time.”9 
In other cases, there is evidence of conflict between contending groups of 
directors, each seeking to use the bank’s resources for its own benefit. For 
instance, around 1810 Eli Brown, a former director of the Hillsborough (New 
Hampshire) Bank,  submitted a petition to the legislature in which he com- 
plained that the bank’s bylaws had enabled its directors “to fix themselves in 
power beyond a possibility of  removal, and in secret conclave, to manage the 
business of the Bank for their own private emolument.” Denying the charge, 
director Samuel Bell claimed that he had lost more than he had gained through 
his connection with the bank, partly because of the heavy debts that Brown 
himself had incurred when he was a director and that he was now trying to 
evade by  fraudulently conveying his property to other parties (Bell  1810 or 
181 1). 
7. Gras (1937, 26, 53-54,  78, 263, 268-69,  273-76); Discount Book,  1786-88,  Massachu- 
8. Discount Book,  1791-93,  and Notes and Bills Discounted, 1798, Rovidence Bank, Fleet 
9. Letter from Moses Brown to the board of directors of the Providence Bank, 29 September 
setts Bank, Bank of Boston Archives, Bank of Boston, Boston. 
National Bank Archives. 
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Surviving minutes of stockholders’ meetings display periodic hints of these 
struggles for control. The normally placid and poorly attended events would 
suddenly attract a large turnout, and instead of following the usual practice of 
reelecting the existing board, the stockholders would split their votes among 
a number of contending candidates. Sometimes a new group would win elec- 
tion.’O One of the functions assumed by the regulatory boards that state legis- 
latures began to create during the  1830s was to mediate these struggles for 
control. Thus, stockholders of  the City Bank of  Providence, Rhode Island, 
sought the intervention of the state’s bank commissioners in 1837, complain- 
ing that the present directors had planned an underhanded scheme to insure 
their reelection at the next annual meeting.  II 
Groups that were excluded from control of  a bank often sought to form 
institutions of their own. Indeed, as many contemporary writers commented, 
one of the primary forces driving the expansion of the banking system in the 
early nineteenth century was the desire to gain privileged access to credit (Ap- 
pleton 1831,  19; Williams 1840, 16; Rhode Island, General Assembly 1826, 
24). By  founding his own bank, a businessman not only assured himself a 
source of funds but at the same time created an effective vehicle for the accu- 
mulation of capital. Once a charter for a bank was secured, the rest was easy. 
Incorporators could subscribe for a controlling interest in the stock, and when 
the payment for the stock came due, they could borrow the requisite sum from 
another institution. These loans were easy to obtain, because they were essen- 
tially riskless: as soon as the state regulators satisfied themselves that the new 
bank’s capital stock had actually been deposited, the investors could borrow 
back the money they had tendered for their stock (even using the stock itself 
as security), and repay the original loan.’* 
At this point, of course, the new bank had virtually no resources to lend to 
its proprietors,  since a large proportion of  its  capital stock was  fictitious. 
Some funds could be raised by  issuing currency, but the Suffolk system lim- 
ited the amounts that could be obtained in this way  by  forcing the bank to 
maintain a deposit of specie to redeem its notes. Deposits by customers, more- 
over, were not yet an important source of funds for the banking sector (see the 
balance sheet in table 5.1). In the early nineteenth century banks raised funds 
10. See, for example, minutes of the  stockholders’ meetings of  3 and  12 December 1849, 
Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1833-55,  American Bank of Providence, Rhode Is- 
land Historical Society Manuscript Collections; Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minutes for 1834 
and 1835, People’s Bank of Roxbury, MA, Bank of Boston Archives; and Stockholders’  Meeting, 
6 October  1829, Stockholders’ Minute Book,  1825-64,  Bunker Hill  Bank, MSS 781, Baker 
Library, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. 
11. Letter from Anthony B. Arnold and Caleb Carter to the Rhode Island Bank Commissioners, 
2 July  1837, Shepley Collection, vol. 8, 57, Rhode Island Historical Society Manuscript Collec- 
tions. 
12. Legislative investigations generated detailed information about such financial practices, 
especially in Massachusetts, where a number of newly chartered banks failed in the aftermath of 
the panic of 1837. See, for example, Massachusetts,  General Court (1838,9-14),  and (1840,28- 
29). See also Rhode Island, General Assembly (1826, 30-32); and Stokes (1902a, 36). 167  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
Table 5.1  Balance Sheet for Massachusetts Banks in 1835 and 1890 
1835 (%)  1890 (%) 
Liabilities 
Capital stock 
Bills in circulation 
Deposits 
Due to other banks 
Other 
Loans and discounts 
Specie 





















Sources: Massachusetts, Secretary of the Commonwealth (1835); U.S. Congress, House (18%). 
252-53. 
primarily through the sale of  stock, for which, as we will see, there were 
many willing purchasers. As  a result, once the original investors had stabi- 
lized their bank’s position, they were usually able to sell off  some of  their 
shareholdings. The proceeds from the sale might be used to repay their stock 
loans at the bank, or else they could pocket the money and substitute some 
new security (usually an endorser) in place of  the stock, in this manner per- 
petuating their lines of credit. Over time, as the bank established a market for 
its securities, they could raise additional funds by increasing the bank’s capi- 
talization and selling new shares. 
Records of the Eagle Bank of Bristol illustrate the ease with which organiz- 
ers could unload their investments. When the bank was chartered in  1818, 
large blocks of stock were bought by members of the DWolf family, as well as 
other prominent citizens of the town, most of whom promptly borrowed back 
their purchase money on the security of  the stock itself. The bank’s  transfer 
book shows that, over the next few years, some of  these early investors sold 
off a substantial portion of their holdings. By  1823, for example, Robert Rog- 
ers, Jr., had reduced his holdings from 300 shares to 146, Charles DWolf, Jr., 
from 320 to 143, and George DWolf from 250 to nothing (though he retained 
liberal borrowing privileges at the bank through the influence of other family 
members). Minutes of the directors’ meetings show that these men were usu- 
ally not required to repay their stock loans when they sold their holdings, but 
instead were allowed to offer new security in the form of an endorser. Hence, 
through this series of  transactions, they were able to transform their initial 
promise to buy stock into wealth (equal to the amount of the stock they later 
sold) and, at the same time, maintain an equivalent line of credit.’) 
Subsequent losses caused by the failure of George DWolf and his associates 
13. Directors’ and Stockholders’  Minute Book, 1814-46,  Stock Transfer Book, 1818-84,  and 
Stock Book, 1818-1900,  Eagle Bank, Fleet National Bank Archives. 168  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
prevented the Eagle Bank from proceeding to the next stage and raising its 
capitalization, but the histories of other banks show how successful this strat- 
egy of  accumulation could be. When the American Bank of  Providence was 
chartered in 1833, for example, it issued only $193,000 of its authorized cap- 
ital  stock of  $500,000.  Two  years  later,  however, the bank’s  stockholders 
voted to increase its capitalization to $300,000. In  1839 they voted to raise it 
once again, this time to $400,000,  and  in  1845 to $500,000.  In  1851 the 
stockholders petitioned the general assembly for permission to increase the 
bank’s authorized capital to  $1,000,000, and state banking records indicate 
that a mere four years later American’s paid-in capital amounted to $983,750. 
The bank’s stockholders thereupon submitted another petition to the legisla- 
ture-this  time to increase the capitalization to $2,000,000.’4 
Nor was this an isolated example. In Boston alone eleven banks were able 
to increase their initial capitalization by at least 50 percent between 1820 and 
1850. In the rest of the state, forty-two banks had a similar record. All in all, 
New Englanders displayed an impressive willingness to put their savings into 
bank stock during this period. The amount invested in the region’s banks in- 
creased 101 percent during the  1830-to-1837 boom and another 97 percent 
during the expansionary 1850s. Over the entire period 1820 to 1860, invest- 
ment in bank stock registered more than a sevenfold increase (see table 5.2). 
To  put these numbers in perspective, the stock of  manufacturing capital in- 
creased only 63 percent over the decade of  the  1850s. By  1860 the paid-in 
capital of  the region’s numerous banks amounted to nearly half the accumu- 
lated stock of manufacturing capital in the region  (Massachusetts, General 
Court 1850, 4-19;  Fenstermaker 1965, 186-247;  Sylla 1975, 249-52;  U.S. 
Census Office 1854, 179; U.S. Census Office 1872,798). 
5.3  Banks as Investment Clubs 
The rapidity with  which capital flowed into bank stock in  this period  is 
intriguing, particularly given the extent to which  banks engaged in  insider 
lending. We  know that the practice was common knowledge. Newspaper edi- 
torials and pamphlets harangued about it, government commissions investi- 
gated it, and state legislatures repeatedly tried to limit it (Lamoreaux 1989a). 
Why then were investors not scared away? Why did they not worry that bank 
directors would  allow their judgment to be clouded by  their own need for 
funds-would  channel excessive amounts of loans into their own enterprises? 
One reason why reports of insider lending had so little effect on the flow of 
capital into banking was that many large purchases of bank stock were made 
by  insurance companies, savings banks, and other institutions whose invest- 
ment decisions were controlled by  the same groups of  men who dominated 
14.  Directors’  and  Stockholders’ Minute  Book,  1833-55,  American  Bank  of  Providence; 
Rhode Island, Secretary of  State (1855, 5). 169  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
Table 5.2  Number and Paid-in Capital Stock of Banks in New England, 
1820-60 
New  Rhode 
Year  Maine  Massachusetts  Hampshire  Island  New England’ 
1820  1.65  10.60  1.00  3.06  16.82 
(15)  (28)  (10)  (31)  (87) 
1830  2.45  19.30  2.10  6.07  34.77 
1837  5.46  38.28  2.84  9.85  66.44 
(55)  (129)  (27)  (62)  (323) 
1850  3.10  34.63  2.19  11.21  62.87 
(32)  (119)  (23)  (61)  (300) 
1860  7.51  64.52  5.02  20.87  123.56 
(68)  (174)  (52)  (91)  (505) 
(18)  (63)  (21)  (46)  (172) 
Sources: Fenstermaker (1965). 186-247;  Sylla (1975), 249-52. 
Note: Numbers of banks are in parentheses. Capital is in millions of dollars 
‘Includes Connecticut and Vermont. 
the  banks.  Thus  the  Providence  Insurance  Company,  controlled  by  the 
Browns,  was by  1814 the largest stockholder in the Providence Bank, also 
controlled by the Browns.  Similarly, the Rhode Island Insurance Company, 
chartered in  1803 in association with the Newport Bank, owned half the lat- 
ter’s stock. More generally, legislatures often deliberately chartered insurance 
companies in conjunction  with specific banks.  They also frequently granted 
charters for savings institutions to groups that had already founded commer- 
cial banks, with the two organizations  sharing a building,  clerical staff, and 
more importantly,  many  of the same officers and directors.  These arrange- 
ments were so prevalent  by the  1850s that Massachusetts’ banking commis- 
sioners expressed reservations about them. In Rhode Island, as late as 1870, 
nine of the eleven savings institutions in the city of Providence each shared at 
least four directors with a commercial bank; for these nine, the average num- 
ber of common directors was seven. Finally, other capital-accumulating insti- 
tutions also established  interlocking directorates  with banks.  In addition to 
being president of the Pawtuxet Bank, for example, James Rhodes was presi- 
dent of the Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry, 
an organization that invested heavily in his bank’s stock.  l5 
But  interlocking directorates  between banks and other institutions cannot 
completely explain the flow of capital into banking, because many individuals 
and institutions without such connections were also heavy purchasers of bank 
stock. In  1840,  for example, bank  regulators  in  Maine published complete 
15. Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1815-85,  Pawtuxet Bank. Lists of  directors 
were taken from the Providence Journal, scattered issues throughout 1870, the Providence Cify 
Directory (1870), and the Rhode Island Business Directory (1872). See also Stokes (1902a, 15- 
16); Redlich (1947, 32-33);  and Bankers’ Magazine  and Statistical  Register 3(May  1854):871. 
For a discussion of  the interlocking directorates employed by the Boston Associates to raise capi- 
tal for their businesses, see Peter Dobkin Hall (1974-75). 170  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
lists of the stockholders of each bank in the state. Analysis of these lists shows 
that on average only 35 percent of  a bank’s stock was owned by  directors, 
other individuals with the same last name, and local institutions whose boards 
of directors might overlap with the bank’s. Although some individuals whose 
last names differed from those of  the directors might also have been closely 
associated with the board, these results suggest that a large proportion of each 
bank’s capital stock was held by outsiders (Maine, Legislature 1840a, 1840b). 
Banks could,  of  course,  compensate outside investors for any risks that 
might be  associated with insider lending by  offering them a higher rate of 
return. Bank stock did pay reasonably good dividends during this period. For 
example, based on the par value of their stock, Boston banks paid out 5.64 
percent per year on the average over the period 183  1 to 1845, despite the long 
depression that began in 1839. During the next decade and a half their divi- 
dends averaged 7.3  1 percent per year, while the dividends of country banks in 
Massachusetts averaged  7.24  percent over the  same period.  Rhode Island 
banks paid  dividends averaging 6.7 percent per  year from  1837 to  1860. 
Maine banks paid 7.27 percent per year between 1850 and 1859. New Hamp- 
shire records are incomplete, but they suggest dividends in excess of 7.5 per- 
cent over the decade 1846 to 1855 (Martin 1898,98-99;  Stokes 1902b, 320- 
21; Rockoff 1990, 32; New Hampshire, Bank Commissioners 1846-56). 
These dividend rates were by no means spectacular, however, and indeed it 
is questionable whether they were high enough to have compensated investors 
for much in the way of added risk. J. Van  Fenstermaker, R. Phil Malone, and 
Stanley R. Stansell calculated the returns that could be earned on the stock of 
Boston banks evaluated at actual market prices. Although shrewd investors 
who bought stock at the lowest recorded price in a given year and then sold it 
at the next year’s highest price could do very well, on the average the rate of 
return that investors could earn on bank stock was less than the yield on com- 
paratively riskless instruments such as Massachusetts municipal securities or 
U.S. government bonds (Fenstermaker, Malone, and Stansell 1988). Investors 
who bought their stock at the time of  the initial offering, when prices were 
usually low, undoubtedly earned significantly higher returns. Nonetheless, the 
existence of a market for the stock at prices that reduced yields to the level of 
comparatively riskless securities suggests that, insider lending notwithstand- 
ing, bank stock seems to have to have been perceived as a safe repository for 
funds.I6 
Other evidence confirms this supposition. Bank stock was one of the few 
securities in which Massachusetts allowed its savings institutions to invest 
their deposits during this period. In addition, so common was  it for men to 
buy stock with an eye to the future needs of their widows and orphans, that by 
1851, about  a  quarter of  the  stock of  Massachusetts banks  was  held  by 
16. Preferential access to credit may have been another incentive to buy stock,  but bank records 
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women,  guardians,  trustees,  and  administrators of  estates (Massachusetts, 
General Court 1836, 319, and  1851, 94). Bankers, moreover, seem to have 
deliberately cultivated this image of  safety for their stock. During times of 
low earnings they were reluctant to cut dividend rates, sometimes, as Massa- 
chusetts’ bank commissioners repeatedly complained, dipping into surplus re- 
sources in order to sustain dividends at a level in excess of current earnings 
(Lake 1932, 168-70). 
If  insider lending was really perceived as a danger, moreover, stockholders 
could have done something about it. Virtually all bank charters in this period 
gave disproportionate power  to  small  investors by  limiting the number of 
votes that those with large numbers of shares could exercise. In addition, as 
time went on the rights of stockholders who were not directors received more 
explicit protection. For instance, in  1840 a Massachusetts statute limited to 
ten the number of  proxy  votes a director or  bank officer could cast; other 
stockholders were permitted up to fifty.  In  1843 the legislature also granted 
stockholders the right, upon the vote of at least one-eighth of their members, 
to investigate the soundness of their bank. Finally, in  1851, the legislature put 
the state’s bank commissioners at the service of stockholders. Whereas previ- 
ously only the commissioners themselves (or the governor) could trigger a 
bank examination, now a request from five stockholders was sufficient to com- 
pel the commissioners to “make a full investigation of the affairs of such cor- 
poration .” 
Occasionally, stockholders did make use of their powers to regulate insider 
lending  by  directors.  At  the  Atlantic Bank  of  Boston,  for example,  they 
passed bylaws specifying that “no loan shall be made to, nor any money de- 
posited with,  any Director, under any colour or pretence whatever, free of 
interest, or at less rate of interest than is required of other persons generally.” 
They also prohibited loans to directors “without other security, than the obli- 
gation or responsibility of  any one Director and his partner or partners in 
trade,” and forbade directors to overdraw their accounts. After the panic of 
1837, the bank’s stockholders responded to a rash of bank failures in the state 
by  voting to limit loans to any one individual or firm to 15 percent of capital. 
They also voted to appoint annually a committee of  “Stockholders who are 
not Directors” to examine the books of the bank.’* 
Such activism was relatively rare,  however.  Minutes of  annual meetings 
show  that  stockholders almost  never  challenged their  directors’ decisions 
about lending policy or, for that matter, anything else. Moreover, not only did 
they generally display little concern about insider lending; there is evidence 
that they positively approved of the practice. After 1851, Massachusetts law 
17. Massachusetts, General Court (1836, 308-20);  Massachusetts, Laws,  14:302-6,  515-17; 
Massachusetts,  AcrsundResolves (1840,208; 1843,56-58;  1851,625-28). 
18. Stockholders’ Bylaws, 18 March  1828, Stockholders’ Meetings,  1  October 1838 and 5 
October 1840, Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1828-64,  Atlantic Bank, Boston, MA, Bank of Bos- 
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required stockholders to ratify by a formal vote loans to directors in excess of 
the statutory limit of 30 percent of the bank’s capital stock. Surviving records 
suggest that stockholders willingly granted such approval. Even at the Atlan- 
tic Bank they voted repeatedly to raise the limit to 50 percent of capital.Ig 
The indulgence with which stockholders treated insider lending is easier to 
understand once one appreciates the importance of reputation in this informa- 
tion-scarce economy. A glance at the credit reports collected by  R. G. Dun 
and Company, for example, shows that character could be as important as net 
worth in eliciting a favorable rating. Men who were considered good credit 
risks were typically described in the reports as “honorable,” “trustworthy,” 
and “prompt” in their payment of debts. Conversely, those who got into finan- 
cial difficulties and defaulted on their obligations might never regain the trust 
of  the business community. Credit reports often ended with an individual’s 
failure, the absence of subsequent entries symbolically recording the borrow- 
er’s financial death. In the relatively rare event that the listing continued, it 
was  typically  full  of  warnings-“unsafe  ,”  “careless  of  credit,” “improvi- 
dent”-and  the resulting inability to raise funds led almost inevitably to a 
subsequent failure  .20 
Not  surprisingly, businessmen went to great lengths to safeguard their rep- 
utations, sometimes to the extent of taking on debts that they had no real legal 
obligation to pay  off.  John James Dixwell, president of  the Massachusetts 
Bank, is a case in point. He had encouraged the bank to loan substantial sums 
of  money to the Boston Brick Manufacturing Company, where he was also 
president. When the company failed in  1855, Dixwell felt that it was incum- 
bent on him to assume its obligations to the bank, even though he was not a 
signatory on any of  its notes. The other directors accepted the payment, ex- 
pressing “the highest respect for that  delicate sense of  honor” which their 
president had displayed. Dixwell’s reputation survived the incident intact, and 
he was able to retain his position at the bank, serving as president for almost 
two decades more (Gras 1937, 128,494-95,502-4). 
As Dixwell’s case suggests, bankers’ regard for their own reputations could 
operate to protect the interests of stockholders. In addition, the fact that banks 
in  this  period  were  for  all practical purposes group-managed enterprises, 
whose directors collectively assumed responsibility for allocating loans, en- 
hanced the workings of this mechanism. If one director overextended himself 
and endangered the institution by borrowing excessive sums of money, all of 
the others stood to suffer. Not only would a bank failure cost them their pre- 
19. Stockholders’ Meetings, 4 October 1852, 3 October 1853, and 2 October 1854 (ibid). See 
also the annual October meetings of  the Shoe and Leather Dealers’ Bank of Boston from 1852 to 
1859, Stockholders’  Minute Book, 1836-64, Bank of Boston Archives; Gras (1937,122);  Warner 
(1892, 13-14); National City Bank of  Lynn, MA (1904,36). 
20. For examples, see Rhode Island vol. 2,63; vol. 9, 121, 176,393,403; vol.  15,51,53;  in 
R.  G. Dun and Company Collection, Baker Library, Harvard University Graduate School of Busi- 
ness Administration. 173  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
ferred access to credit, but it threatened their reputations as well. As a result, 
bank insiders might be expected to monitor closely each other’s borrowing 
habits. Given the poor quality of information in this period, moreover, such 
monitoring of insiders by insiders may actually have been less risky than ex- 
tending credit to perfect strangers. Although bank directors might have occa- 
sionally given way to temptation and loaned too much of their funds to them- 
selves, they also had much more information about the businesses of  those 
with whom they were personally connected-information  that enabled them 
to make more informed decisions about loan amounts than they could in deal- 
ing with strangers. Over the long run, this information advantage could lower 
losses from bad debts, as Andrew Beveridge found when he studied insider 
lending at  the  Cheshire Provident Institution for  Savings in  Keene,  New 
Hampshire. Over the period  1833 to 1897, Beveridge calculated, 98 percent 
of  all funds loaned to people who were personally connected with the bank 
were paid back, as opposed to 90 percent of all other loans (Beveridge 1985, 
402). 
Finally, in order to understand the willingness of stockholders in this period 
to condone insider lending, one must appreciate the role banks played in pro- 
viding small investors with a safe way to participate in the gains from indus- 
trialization. The great textile mills of the Boston Associates earned handsome 
returns throughout this period, but their stock was closely held by members of 
the group and rarely appeared on the market (Martin 1898, 126). Some of the 
smaller textile enterprises that sprang up throughout the region were also quite 
profitable, but many were not, and large numbers of  them actually failed. In 
Rhode Island, for example, approximately two-fifths of the textile mills in the 
state closed in 1819 and another 15 percent failed in the late 1820s. The latter 
crisis also brought  down  many  of  the  state’s textile machinery producers 
(Coleman 1969, 88-89,  91-92,  100-103).  Direct investment in these smaller 
enterprises was a risky proposition and was perceived by investors as such, as 
is evidenced by the difficulties in raising capital that the few that incorporated 
themselves had. Thus a corporate charter secured in  1835 by  Gamaliel Gay 
for a silk manufacturing enterprise in Rhode Island never became operational 
because the firm was unable to attract the necessary support. Most of the other 
manufacturing corporations chartered in the state in the first half of the nine- 
teenth century suffered similar fates (Coleman 1969, 114-17). 
Investments in manufacturing were, in fact, so risky-and  also provided so 
little opportunity for economies of scale-that  few entrepreneurs specialized 
in them exclusively. Most of the men who developed textile mills in the region 
also invested in commerce, real estate, and/or transportation ventures. It is 
well known that important merchant groups like the  Boston Associates in 
Massachusetts and the Brown family in Rhode Island followed a strategy of 
diversification. What is not so often recognized, however, is that many less 
familiar entrepreneurs pursued similar plans. Thus Samuel Weston and Abner 
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vestments in local mills, timberlands, lumbering, and railroads. Stephen Har- 
ris, one of the organizers of  the Centreville Bank in Warwick, Rhode Island, 
had a medical practice, a pharmaceutical dispensary and grocery business, 
large textile-mill investments, a farm, and a limestone quarry. Similarly, the 
men that controlled the Cheshire Provident Institution for Savings in Keene, 
New Hampshire, were involved in a variety of enterprises ranging from textile 
mills to railroads to local utilities (First National Bank of Skowhegan, Maine 
1925,57,65-69; Basham 1973,2-3,21-23;  Beveridge 1985,396). 
The problem, of course, with such a strategy of diversification was that it 
required considerable amounts of  capital-amounts  that were typically be- 
yond the reach of  all but the wealthiest merchant families. Banks helped to 
solve this problem for less affluent groups by providing them with the where- 
withal to diversify their interests. At the same time, they enabled the men, 
women, and institutions that purchased their stock to achieve a similar level 
of  diversification by buying what was in essence a share of the group’s total 
investments. Because bank loans in this period were usually secured by the 
endorsements of respected businessmen rather than by specific items of collat- 
eral, they were backed by  all the resources (the full diversified portfolios) of 
both the maker of the loan and his endorser(s). 
Of  course, the phenomenon I am describing here is in a sense simply the 
familiar one of financial intermediation. The practice of insider lending gave 
this well-known banking function an important twist, however, because pur- 
chasers of bank stock knew that they were investing in the diversified enter- 
prises of  the particular group that controlled the bank-not  in some anony- 
mously diversified portfolio.  In other words, the practice of  insider lending 
conveyed information to the public about the nature of a bank’s investments, 
and this information enabled investors to make important choices-to  decide, 
for example, whether to pursue the less risky option of entrusting their funds 
to members of the established elite, or to take a chance with aspiring entrepre- 
neurs. 
That investors did indeed make use of such information is suggested by the 
widely different prices commanded by  the stock of each bank in the year im- 
mediately following its organization, that is, before it could establish its own 
earnings record. For example, the initial selling price of  the stock issued by 
the seven banks chartered in Boston in 1836 (par value $100) ranged from $75 
to $100, using  each bank’s lowest quotation,  or  $94 to $100, using  each 
bank’s highest (Martin 1898, 97-101).21 Over time, of course, the price com- 
manded by a bank’s stock reflected its actual record of earnings, but investors’ 
assessment of  the character of  the group that controlled the bank remained 
important. For Boston banks in 1854, for example, the dividend record of the 
past ten years explained only about 26 percent of the cross-sectional variation 
21. Martin reported only the highest and lowest quotations for each year. He provided no infor- 
mation about the quantities sold at each price. Nor did he calculate an  average price for the year. 175  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
in stock prices (compared to a common par value of  $100), using the year’s 
lowest quotations, and 52 percent of the variation using the highest. The ad- 
dition of  a variable for the year in which each bank was chartered (a crude 
proxy for the character of the bank’s directors, since the most prestigious mer- 
chants received charters first) added about 15 to 20 percentage points to the 
explanatory power of the equation, with the oldest banks generally displaying 
the highest stock prices (see table 5.3). Given the crudeness of the proxy, it is 
likely that much of the remaining variance can also be explained by  differ- 
ences in the public’s assessment of the character of the banks’ directors and 
their business interests. 
In  sum, although the prevalence of  insider lending cannot be explained 
simply as a response to the scarcity of  information in the early-nineteenth- 
century economy, the practice did have important implications for the flow of 
information in the economy. Bank managers knew a lot about the business of 
their primary borrowers-themselves  and their close relatives and associates. 
Moreover, the fact that a large proportion of each bank’s loans went to insiders 
gave  potential investors useful  information about the  kinds  of  assets that 
backed up its portfolio. Indeed, it would not  be too farfetched to argue that 
early commercial banks were in essence investment clubs, the counterparts of 
our modern mutual funds. The sale of bank stock enabled small savers to buy 
shares in a diversified portfolio of  investments whose character differed in 
important and known ways from one institution to the next. It thus gave small 
investors a way  of  participating in the gains from industrialization without 
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exposing them to serious risks. At  the same time, banks provided entrepre- 
neurs with a mechanism they could use to tap the community’s savings and 
channel the proceeds into industrial development. 
5.4  The Decline of Insider Lending 
This early-nineteenth-century banking system contained the seeds of  its 
own destruction, however. Economic development and the tremendous expan- 
sion that occurred in the number and size of banks transformed New England 
from a capital-scarce to a capital-rich economy. Development also reduced the 
risks involved in specialization, making it easier for firms to raise funds for 
their ventures directly, without the assistance of financial intermediaries. Both 
of  these changes in turn operated to reduce the incidence of  insider lending. 
Since funds were now more widely available, bank directors had less need to 
draw on their own  institutions for loans. Although insider lending by  no 
means disappeared (many directors still used their positions to obtain funds, 
and some banks continued to operate exclusively in the interests of their direc- 
tors), records that are extant from the last two decades of the nineteenth cen- 
tury suggest that it was now much more common for insiders to account for 
less than 20 percent of a bank’s total loans.22 
A good example is the case of the Providence Bank, which was dominated 
for more than a century after its 1791 founding by  the interrelated Brown, 
Ives, and Goddard families. As we have already seen, in the years immedi- 
ately  following  its  organization,  the  bank’s  lendable funds  were  largely 
absorbed by  insiders. Over time, however, as the region’s credit markets ma- 
tured and the family’s textile ventures became themselves important genera- 
tors of  capital, the Browns turned less frequently to their bank for funds. 
Thanks to the diaries of the Goddard Brothers Company, the firm that man- 
aged the Browns’ various textile enterprises, the family’s relationship with the 
bank can be followed for the last quarter of the nineteenth century in particu- 
larly close detail. William Goddard, a senior partner in the firm, was president 
of the Providence Bank for most of this period.23 
The diaries show that Brown-family enterprises continued in the late nine- 
teenth century to use the Providence National Bank for a variety of purposes.24 
The family’s textile businesses kept funds on deposit there, and one of them, 
22. Reports of national bank examiners to the comptroller of the currency indicate that directors 
of  Boston banks accounted on the average for about 9 percent of  their banks’ loans in the early 
1890s. These figures did not include loans to relatives or to corporations with which the directors 
were connected. For specific examples supporting the 20 percent figure that are based on banks’ 
internal records, see Lamoreaux (1989b). The records of the U.S. Comptroller of  the Currency, 
Examination Division, are stored in the National Archives in Washington, Record Group 101. 
23. Goddard Brothers Diaries, Brown and Ives Manufacturing Records, MSS 9, subgroup 10, 
series D, Rhode Island Historical Society Manuscript Collections. See also Hedges (1968, 255- 
56). 
24. Like many other banks, the Providence Bank reorganized under the new National Banking 
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the Lonsdale Company, routinely had its payroll made up at the bank. The 
records also show that Goddard Brothers occasionally drew upon the bank for 
loans, sometimes of  substantial size.  For example,  in November  1879 the 
diaries record, “We discount at Prov. Nat’ Bank  + Prov. Ins for Savings all 
Bills Receivable due Dec + Jan belonging to Lonsdale + Hope Co.” A few 
years later, in November 1886, the notation appears, “Bk lends all its money 
to L Co + H Co @ 5%. Money still scarce about here.”25 
Goddard Brothers was, however, just as likely to be in the position of the 
bank’s creditor, as its debtor. In July  1881 the firm loaned the Providence 
National Bank $50,000 on call so that it could meet heavy drafts by the Prov- 
idence Institution for Savings. A few days later the diaries noted, “The bank 
does little business as it owes $150000 to L Co + this is remittance day.” In 
1889 Goddard Brothers once again helped the bank meet heavy demands by 
the savings institution for funds.26 
Indeed, the general position of the Brown family’s enterprises with respect 
to the money markets was that of a creditor. For the better part of each year, 
revenue from sales poured into the Goddard Brothers’ counting house, and the 
firm’s main problem was to find suitable investment  Only during the 
fall cotton-buying season did the family’s enterprises ever have substantial 
need for credit, but even then they were much less likely to borrow from the 
Providence National Bank than they were from other institutions, especially 
in Boston. According to notations in the diaries, Goddard Brothers negotiated 
loans totaling approximately $4,479,000 from banks and other kinds of  finan- 
cial  intermediaries  between  1878 and  1898.  Of  this  amount  only  about 
$333,000 (7 percent) came  from  the  Providence National  Bank.  Another 
$563,000  (13 percent) came  from  the  Providence Institution for  Savings, 
which the family also dominated, and $740,000 (17 percent) from the Rhode 
Island Hospital Trust Company, an  institution that the family had helped to 
create but did not control. All of the remainder came from Boston institutions, 
which supplied the firm with approximately $2,793,000 in loans, 63 percent 
of its total borrowing.  28 
Goddard Brothers turned to Boston banks for loans because, as the diaries 
suggest,  it found interest rates in  that  city generally lower than  in Provi- 
den~e.~~  Family members, it seems, would rather borrow out of town at good 
rates than use their leverage as insiders at the Providence National Bank to 
25. Goddard Brothers Diaries, vol. 2, 17 November 1879, and vol. 9,22  November 1886. 
26. Ibid., vol. 4,  26 July  1881 and 1 August 1881, and vol. 12, 23 October 1889. 
27. A large portion of  the diary entries are taken up with notations of purchases of commercial 
paper or  money loaned on call. But see especially ibid., vol. 8, 24 April  1885, and vol. 12, 13 
June 1889. 
28. Amounts for three  loans (two from Providence National Bank,  one from the Providence 
Institution for Savings, and one from an unnamed Boston institution) were not given. I estimated 
the  missing amounts by calculating the average size of  the loans from each source (ibid., vols. 1- 
21). 
29. See, for example, ibid., vol. 1, 23 December 1878, andvol. 21, 24 January 1898. 178  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
obtain favorable terms for their enterprises. It  seems that they preferred to 
protect their bank’s earnings (and also the dividends on their extensive stock- 
holdings) by  loaning out the bank’s funds at the market  rate of  interest to 
creditworthy borrowers, even to their business rivals. According to an entry 
for October 1896, “our enemies have been borrowing heavily of  Prov Bk  In 
all they will have taken 50000 each or 200,000 on notes maturing this year at 
6%.”  The diarist seemed pleased with the result, for he went on in the next 
sentence to note, “The City [of Providence] deposit is very convenient to us.” 
For the Browns, banking had become by the late nineteenth century a business 
in  its own right,  an investment to be  carefully managed  and  prized for its 
good, steady yields.30 
The  Providence  National  Bank  is  perhaps  an  extreme  example  of  the 
changes that were occumng in the banking sector, because the Brown family’s 
ventures were so extraordinarily successful that they could command favor- 
able credit terms in Boston as well as Providence. But as the century pro- 
gressed, an increasing number of banks found themselves for a variety of rea- 
sons with resources in excess of the needs of the parties that controlled them 
and sometimes even beyond the requirements of the local community. Some 
banks had extra funds because their directors (like the Browns) were able to 
generate most of  their capital internally or could turn to outside sources of 
funding. Other banks were so successful in attracting lendable resources that 
they overshot local needs. And sometimes banks had surplus funds because 
the groups that had originally founded them were no longer actively involved 
in business, either as a result of business troubles, an inability to pass on the 
enterprise to the next generation, or some other cause. 
Whatever the reason, the appearance of these surplus funds had a snowball- 
ing effect that operated to reduce the incidence of insider lending in the econ- 
omy  in general. To  the extent that banks  had  surplus funds that could be 
loaned to outsiders, the funding opportunities for those who were insiders in 
other banks increased. Moreover, to the extent that these insiders did in fact 
turn  to other institutions for loans,  they freed up funds in their care to be 
loaned to ventures in which they had no personal interest, which in turn freed 
up funds at still other institutions for similar purposes. 
5.5  The Problem of Collecting Information about Creditworthiness 
As  banks increased the proportion of  funds they loaned to outsiders, the 
problem of  evaluating the creditworthiness of  would-be borrowers took on 
30. Ibid., vol. 19,9  October 1896. The Providence National Bank paid dividends of  10 percent 
from 1870 to 1876.7 percent from 1877 to 1879, and 8 percent from 1880  to 1900. By  1880, the 
Brown, Ives, and Goddard family group owned 61 percent of  the bank’s stock (Directors’ and 
Stockholders’  Minute  Books,  1865-80,  1880-96,  1896-1915,  and  Stock  Ledger,  1857-85, 
Providence National Bank, Fleet National Bank Archives). 179  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
new seriousness. When bankers loaned their funds primarily to insiders, they 
dealt with businessmen whose strengths and weaknesses were well known to 
them. But once bankers began to loan their funds to those with whom they 
had no personal connections-once  they began to accommodate customers in 
distant communities-they  had to develop new ways of distinguishing worthy 
borrowers from the great mass of applicants. 
Bankers attempted to cope with this new information problem in a number 
of ways. In the first place, they displayed a heightened interest in the business 
of discounting what was called “real” commercial paper-that  is, notes issued 
in the course of actual commercial transactions (e.g., sales by a manufacturer 
to a wholesaler).  Such loans were considered desirable because (it was be- 
lieved) they were self-liquidating  : once the wholesaler disposed of the goods 
he had bought from the manufacturer, he would be able to redeem the IOU he 
had issued to cover the purchase (West 1977, 136-62; Mintz 1945,206-10). 
More to the point,  such loans were  also thought to  minimize information 
problems. Because the manufacturer had to scrutinize the wholesaler’s stand- 
ing before he would risk his own credit by  endorsing the note, bankers felt 
that it was usually not necessary for them to conduct further credit investiga- 
tions. As the conservative Chicago banker James B. Forgan instructed an au- 
dience of bank employees in Providence, “The strength of the promise is not 
in this case of prime importance, and need not therefore be as closely consid- 
ered” (Forgan 1920, 8). 
Some commentators went so far as to argue that, because commercial paper 
bore a one-to-one correspondence to the actual wealth-generating activities of 
the economy, it was for all practical purposes as good as gold. As one writer 
explained,  “Commodities  are,  after  all,  the  only  things  that  are  really 
wealth. . . . [I]t is only by convertibility into food, fuel, clothing, and shelter 
that anything becomes of value. Gold is wealth because of  its convertibility; 
and  in the same way,  credit is wealth” (Woodlock 1907, 23-24).  If  credit 
based on real bills was tantamount to wealth, it mattered little to whom a bank 
granted its discounts. So  long as all the notes in its portfolio were bona fide 
commercial paper, the bank was safe. Information problems were thus mini- 
mized. 
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, commercial paper of 
this type was increasingly difficult to come by.  In  response to the monetary 
disturbances of the Civil War era, manufacturers began to encourage custom- 
ers to pay  for goods in cash by  offering them price discounts. Buyers re- 
sponded to these incentives by changing the way they borrowed on the credit 
markets. Rather than paying for their purchases with an IOU, which the seller 
then endorsed and discounted at a bank (making it two-name or “real” corn- 
mercial paper), buyers began to issue IOUs in advance of purchases in order 
to take advantage of the discounts. The result was a decline in the proportion 
of  real bills on the market and a corresponding increase in what was called 
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paper was effectively unsecured and was not directly linked to the completion 
of any particular commercial transaction. Whether it was a good investment 
or not depended on the financial soundness of the maker (James 1978,55-59; 
West 1977, 157-62). 
The shift to this new kind of instrument coincided with the development of 
a national market for commercial paper, which compounded bankers’ prob- 
lems in evaluating the worth of  these notes. In the early nineteenth century 
borrowers had typically restricted their dealings to one or two local banks, 
which as a consequence always had a good sense of  their customers’ total 
obligations. But now that firms could issue their IOUs through note brokers, 
who would market them to banks and other financial intermediaries across the 
country, banks lost their ability to assess a customer’s total indebtedness. As 
an article in Bankers’ Magazine reminded readers, by negotiating their loans 
through bill brokers, borrowers were “able to float much more paper in many 
cases than they could if they depended on one or two banks for funds. Herein 
is the risk of this new mode of lending money; a bank is utterly at sea concern- 
ing the ability of the borrower” (48[July 1893]:163-64). 
Banks therefore had to find other ways of coping with their growing infor- 
mation problems. One solution that was commonly adopted was to require 
borrowers to put up collateral for loans (ibid. 39[August 1884]:113-22).  Be- 
cause the National Banking Acts prohibited banks from loaning on the secu- 
rity of real estate, collateral necessarily consisted for the most part of  securi- 
ties that commanded a ready market on the exchanges. As a result, this type 
of  loan was most useful to businesses that themselves issued marketable se- 
curities  (the best  examples  were  the  railroads-industrial  securities were 
rarely traded on the exchanges before the turn of the century) and for those 
engaged in the buying and selling of  stocks and bonds. But collateral loans 
could be of only limited use to most other borrowers, for the obvious reason 
that businesses that had the surplus funds to invest in marketable securities 
were not likely to be the ones most in need of funds. Not  surprisingly, then, 
despite their obvious advantages for banks, collateral loans remained only a 
small part of  their total portfolios. As late as  1890, 64  percent of the loans 
granted by Boston’s national banks were still based entirely on personal secu- 
rity (U.S. Congress, House 1900, 141). 
Another way  that banks coped with their growing information problems 
was to insist that borrowers maintain deposits of a certain minimum size with 
the bank. While this requirement may initially have been a mechanism that 
enabled banks surreptitiously to earn interest in excess of  the usury ceiling, 
by the last few decades of the century falling interest rates had made the usury 
laws increasingly irrelevant. The practice seems to have continued more than 
anything else for the information it communicated about borrowers’ credit- 
worthiness, and for the discipline it imposed on debtors’ balance sheets. As 
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is that offered by firms or individuals who are in the habit of carrying balances 
with their bank from whom the accommodation should be obtained. There 
appears to me no better means to determine the amount of risk a bank incurs 
than by regulating its loans according to the average balance carried” (20[May 
1893]:486-89).  Another banker pointed out that the requirement to maintain 
compensating balances helped to prevent losses by  insuring that customers 
had a “cash reserve for emergencies” (Forgan 1920, 17). 
But the protection that was offered by  borrowers’ deposits was limited at 
best. Although the relationship between the deposit and the loan amount var- 
ied so much from one institution to the next that commentators were loath to 
generalize, the ratio was likely to have been small, especially after the com- 
petition for deposits heated up in the latter part of the century. Commentators 
repeatedly complained that banks attempted to lure new depositors by prom- 
ising them excessive lines of credit (Barrett 1907, 285; Forgan 1920, 17).3’ 
In any event, none of the methods thus far described did much to reduce the 
heavy losses that banks were experiencing in the last few decades of the cen- 
tury. Minutes of directors’ meetings reveal that, beginning in the mid-l870s, 
banks faced soaring numbers of unpaid and overdue loans (the overwhelming 
majority of  them involving outsiders), and bank examiners’ reports show no 
improvement over the remainder of the century.32  Although much of the prob- 
lem undoubtedly resulted from the rocky state of  the economy in this period, 
bankers were desperate to improve the situation. By the 1890s, they had be- 
come convinced that “by far the greater part of  losses incurred by  banks on 
commercial paper could have been avoided had their officers been possessed 
of  sufficient information regarding the applicants at the time the loan was 
asked for.”  33 
One thing was clear: bankers could no longer afford to base their credit 
decisions on the general reputation of  a borrower for wealth and character. 
Even country bankers were now likely to be misled by the personal knowledge 
they thought they had about their borrowers’ businesses, as one such banker 
31. Bank records are usually silent about these arrangements. The one example I have come 
across was an agreement noted in the minutes of the Shawmut National Bank, specifying that an 
out-of-town firm would be  granted a line of credit of $40,000 secured by  collateral. It was ex- 
pected that in return the firm would keep on deposit an amount equivalent to 20 percent of its debt 
(Directors’ Meeting, 27 September  1875, Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1865-77, 
Shawmut National Bank, Shawmut Bank Archives, Shawmut Bank, Boston. 
32. Only ten of  the approximately  two hundred problem  loans noted in the minutes of  six 
Boston banks between  1880 and 1900 could be traced to the banks’ directors. The banks were 
Atlantic National,  Boylston National, Commercial National, Faneuil Hall National, Fourth Na- 
tional,  and National City. The records of these banks are all in the Bank of Boston Archives. I 
traced the firms whose debts were unpaid through the Boston city directories in order to learn the 
names of all the local partners involved. The trend in losses was calculated from the reports of 
national bank examiners to the U.S. Comptroller of  the Currency, 1876-95  (Boston banks only). 
33.  Rhodes’  Journal  of  Bunking  2O(June  1893):585-92.  See  also  Bankers’  Magazine 
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found when he determined to write into a credit book everything that he “pos- 
itively knew, or could learn from unquestionable sources” about his borrow- 
ers. To  his “astonishment” he discovered “how little I really knew.” He con- 
cluded from his  experiment that  he  and other bankers had been  “granting 
credits on ‘general reputation’ unworthily.”  34 
For years bankers had supplemented their personal knowledge by subscrib- 
ing to the reports issued by commercial credit agencies such as R. G. Dun and 
Company. These reports were rarely based on financial statements filed by the 
firm in question. More frequently they consisted of estimates of the worth of 
the firm and of  the character of  its proprietors based on the surmises of local 
lawyers and businessmen-precisely  the kinds of  information that bankers 
were discovering to be inadequate. Not surprisingly, then, by the 1890s bank- 
ers were questioning the worth of such reports and arguing that more system- 
atic methods of collecting information were needed. To  a large extent, they 
argued, bankers would have to take charge of  this responsibility themselves 
by organizing credit departments within their organizations and requiring fi- 
nancial statements from all of  their customers. These more rigorous proce- 
dures would pay off, it was argued, because many applicants for loans were 
in fact unworthy of  credit.  In order to demonstrate “the value of  a careful 
investigation of credits,” one writer asked a New York bank with a credit de- 
partment to prepare a summary of its investigation of 1,598  would-be borrow- 
ers. “Of these, 798, or practically 50 percent., were unsatisfactory and credit 
was refused.” The implication of the lesson was that without its credit inves- 
tigation department,  the bank  would not have been as able to discriminate 
among the various applicants for loans and would have faced heavy losses as 
a result.  35 
Writers not only urged banks to require financial statements from their cus- 
tomers, but insisted that these statements be interpreted in a very specific way. 
A customer’s resources should be divided into fixed assets on the one hand, 
and quick or convertible assets on the other. Only the latter, they argued, were 
the proper foundation for loans. Moreover, loans should not be  granted if  a 
borrower’s liabilities exceeded 50 percent of  his quick assets, “the so-called 
50 per cent. rule.’’ Even on this basis, loans should be granted for only short 
periods of time, at most six months and preferably less (Cannon 1907,44,47; 
Forgan 1920, 8-10). 
How this particular prescription emerged is a matter of  some importance, 
because by definition it ruled out important categories of loans to manufactur- 
ers. The emphasis on quick assets meant that much of the capital invested by 
manufacturers in their businesses, even if  unencumbered, would not be con- 
34.  Bankers’  Magazine  57(August  1898):286-87.  See  also  Rhodes’  Journal  of  Banking 
35. Bankers’ Magazine 47(January 1893):535-36. See also Cannon (1891,6-8). 
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sidered a proper basis for  At the same time, the insistence on loans of 
short duration meant that manufacturers could not borrow from banks to fi- 
nance improvements in plant and equipment that might take a longer period to 
generate returns. 
Many writers justified their emphasis on short-term commercial loans by 
emphasizing the greater need for liquidity that resulted from the growth of 
deposit banking. According to a pamphlet issued by the American Institute of 
Banking, “experience shows that a bank all of whose assets can be converted 
into cash within a few months without loss is altogether unlikely to be dis- 
turbed by lack of confidence, and should it be subjected to unfounded rumors 
no difficulty is experienced in securing the necessary funds from other banks” 
(Loans and investments 19 16, 12). 
But the argument that short-term loans necessarily led to greater liquidity 
made  little sense,  as even the writers of  this pamphlet seemed to realize. 
Under conditions of crisis, portfolios consisting entirely of  short-term com- 
mercial loans could be as difficult to liquidate as those with a significant pro- 
portion of long-term loans, because bankers typically had to renew their cus- 
tomers’ -notes in order to avoid alienating them or precipitating failures that 
would render the loans themselves uncollectible (ibid.,  14-15;  Mintz 1945, 
216-19).  Liquidity needs, bankers recognized, had to be met in other ways, 
and it was common to recommend that a bank invest 20 percent of its funds in 
high-grade bonds and securities, “such as are convertible at a moment’s no- 
tice,” and another 20 percent in commercial paper purchased in the open mar- 
ket, which would be free of  any pressure for renewal at maturity. With the 
liquidity of the institution thus safely assured, the bank could loan the remain- 
ing 60 percent of its funds locally for the benefit of its customers. But despite 
the recognition that these assets would generally be unavailable in times of 
emergency, writers still insisted that “the conclusion should not be  drawn, 
however, that the loans made to such regular customers need not possess the 
quality of liquidness.” Loans to regular customers should also be granted for 
brief periods only and should be based solely on the firms’ short-term assets 
(Loans and Investments, 1916, 14-15; Coman 1907,66-77). 
Careful study of the pamphlets that promoted this advice suggests that at 
the heart of the matter was concern about information and monitoring prob- 
lems-not  liquidity per se. Short-term loans based on quick assets were de- 
sired because they helped to discipline the borrower. Bankers expected “that 
borrowers will use the proceeds of  loans which they are to repay in a few 
months more wisely than might be the case if the payment were indefinitely 
deferred.” Moreover, because the information contained in a borrower’s finan- 
cial statement reflected current conditions only and was liable to “change rad- 
36. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, a few writers did express doubts about the 
formula precisely on these grounds. See, for  example, Hogg (1915,  26) and H. G.  Moulton 
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ically for the worse” with the passage of time, such statements were clearly “a 
basis of short time credit only” (Loans andlnvestments 1916,  14-15). 
5.6  The Problem of Communicating Information about Soundness 
At the same time as the decline of insider lending made it more difficult for 
banks to assess the creditworthiness of their borrowers, it also made it more 
difficult for investors and (now more importantly) depositors to evaluate the 
soundness of  each bank. Now  that only a small proportion of  loans went to 
insiders, the identity of a bank’s directors conveyed little information to inves- 
tors about the content of the institution’s loan portfolio. Worse still, the iden- 
tity of  the directors also conveyed less and less information about the quality 
of the bank’s management team, since directors tended to lose interest in over- 
seeing a bank once their need for its funds diminished. Indeed, by  the last 
three decades of  the nineteenth century, many directors had begun to shirk 
their responsibilities, failing to attend the regular meetings of the board and 
delegating increasing amounts of their authority to the bank’s executive offi- 
cers. Attendance reached an all-time low, for example, at the weekly meetings 
held  to scrutinize recent discounts. Only two of  the seven directors of  the 
Boylston National Bank of Boston were present at least for 70 percent of the 
board’s meetings in  1880. Only three of the Massachusetts National Bank’s 
nine directors had  a similar attendance record,  as did only one of  the nine 
directors of  the People’s National Bank of  Roxbury. The pattern, moreover, 
was the same at many other  institution^.^' 
The problem with this negligence was that it opened the way for opportun- 
istic behavior by  the bank’s management team (the president and/or cashier 
and the bank’s few active directors). These men could use their positions of 
authority to loan themselves large sums of money without the consent of the 
rest of the board and, of course, without the knowledge of the general public. 
Whether these loans were more likely to lead to losses than the insider loans 
so common in  early-nineteenth-century banks is impossible to  determine. 
What is certain is that contemporaries regarded such behavior as increasingly 
dangerous. By the 1880s it had become a truism that large loans to insiders 
were the major cause of bank failures. As Comptroller of the Currency Wil- 
liam  Barret  Ridgely  insisted  in  a  sentiment  that  was  voiced  repeatedly 
throughout the period, “The practically universal rule is that all failures are 
due to excess loans to one interest or group of interests, generally owned or 
controlled by the officers of the bank itself” (quoted in Moxey 1905,33). 
But how were investors and depositors to know which banks were engaged 
37. Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1864-87,  Boylston National Bank of Boston; 
Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1865-83,  Massachusetts National Bank of  Boston; 
Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1864-83,  People’s National Bank of  Roxbury, MA; 
all in Bank of  Boston Archives. The generalization is based on my reading of  directors’ minute 
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in such dangerous practices? And how were banks that eschewed such prac- 
tices to communicate this fact to the public at large? The question was not 
merely an academic one, for at stake was the banks’ ability to raise funds. 
Moreover, unless the public was able to distinguish among the various banks, 
the failure of  any one of  them threatened to undermine public confidence in 
the banking system as a whole and with it the public’s willingness to hold 
deposits. As Charles W.  Calomiris and Gary Gorton have pointed out, infor- 
mation asymmetries made it difficult for depositors to monitor the perform- 
ance of individual banks. Whenever depositors believed that some banks were 
in danger of failing but were unable to identify the particular institutions at 
risk,  they  might  withdraw  their  savings  indiscriminately, precipitating a 
system-wide panic.38 
Contemporary bankers understood this danger all too well. As one writer 
in Bankers’ Magazine explained, “We are in a most important sense directly 
responsible for each other, and cannot avoid being disturbed by the ignorance, 
selfishness or immoral conduct of our most remote members.” Or, as another 
writer succinctly put it, “Every bank that fails through mism-anagement weak- 
ens the surrounding ones.” The danger was dramatically illustrated in early 
1884 when several failures, “all attributable to the madness of speculation by 
bank officers,” caused depositors to panic. In Vermont, for example, the fail- 
ure of the First National Bank of  St. Albans (allegedly caused by  an “unfor- 
tunate speculation in stocks by  its president and cashier”) led to a run on the 
National Union Bank of Swanton, even though professionals regarded the sol- 
vency of the latter bank as undoubted: “To meet only $52,000 due depositors, 
it held $1 17,000 of good, short time paper.”  That same year the Bankers’ 
Magazine despaired that “many business men are suspicious of other banks, 
and, by withdrawing their deposits, are doing their utmost to bring on the very 
condition of things they deplore.”  39 
38. Calomiris and Gorton (1991). One writer claimed that it was “much more difficult to secure 
trustworthy information in regard to the standing of a bank than it [was] in regard to the standing 
of  a commercial firm.” Although each national bank published a financial statement biannually, 
these documents contained no information at all about the contents of  the banks’ loan portfolios. 
Moreover, the balance sheets of  many banks looked roughly similar. For example, in  1885 the 
average ratio of capital plus surplus to total liabilities for Boston banks was about 35 percent, with 
nearly half of them falling within the range of 30 to 40 percent. At the same time, the fact that five 
of  the nine banks with ratios below 25 percent were among the most successful in  the city in 
attracting deposits suggests that savers may not  have paid  much attention to such information 
anyway (Rhodes Journal of  Bunking 15[March 1888]:232;  U.S.  Congress, House, 1885,62-83). 
39. Bankers’  Magazine  38(May  1884):886, 38(June  1884):901-2,  39(July  1884):45, and 
42(August 1887):83. William Goddard himself painfully learned this lesson in the late 1870s, 
when a savings-bank panic spread to the rock-solid Providence Institution for Savings. Over the 
course of the run the savings bank lost nearly $500,000, in deposits. On the worst day of the panic 
about $195,000 was withdrawn. That night the Providence National Bank stayed open until 10:30 
in order to pay checks drawn on it by the savings institution. Cash ran low, and Goddard had to 
arrange for $425,000 to be shipped express from New York. See Goddard Brothers Diaries, vol. 
1,8, 12,26,27, and 29 April 1878; Directors’ Meeting, 27 April 1878, Directors’ and Stockhold- 
ers’ Minute Book, 1865-80,  hovidence National Bank, Fleet National Bank Archives; Provi- 
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Just as their predecessors in the early nineteenth century had developed the 
Suffolk system to guard against the monetary excesses of the country banks, 
bankers responded in similar fashion to this new danger by attempting to reg- 
ulate the behavior of  their colleagues. The Boston Clearing House, the re- 
gion’s first such institution, was originally founded in  1855 to facilitate the 
settling of accounts among the city’s many banks. But its potential usefulness 
as an instrument of regulation soon became apparent. In addition to clearing 
checks, the organization could be used to instill public confidence as well as 
to prevent runs on its membership by  serving as a lender of  last resort for 
temporarily insolvent banks, thereby safeguarding the public’s deposits. Since 
this service was only available to members, moreover, admission to the clear- 
ing house became a prize that could be offered as a reward for good manage- 
ment practices or denied as a punishment for financial transgressions (Gorton 
1985; Gorton and Mullineaux 1987). The Pacific National Bank of  Boston, 
for example, was excluded from the clearing house because the city’s leading 
bankers disapproved of  its management and “decidedly and successfully op- 
posed its admission.”40 
Unlike the Suffolk system, however, the clearing house was of only limited 
effectiveness as a disciplinary tool. In the first place, banks like Pacific Na- 
tional typically arranged to clear their checks through allied member institu- 
tions, a practice that potentially jeopardized the latter’s safety. When the Pa- 
cific National Bank failed in  1881, for example, its correspondent, Central 
National, faced heavy losses and had to be rescued by  the associated banks 
(Patten  1896, 357). Second, the organization could not  afford to be  overly 
selective, because denying membership to a large number of  banks would 
have  undermined clearing-house effectiveness both  in  clearing checks and 
maintaining public confidence in the banking system (Bolles 1890). Third, 
the kinds of general balance-sheet information that the clearing houses rou- 
tinely collected did not  provide any information about loan portfolios.  Al- 
though clearing-house officials had the authority to conduct a full examination 
of each bank’s affairs, such powers were usually reserved for emergencies. 
Moreover,  even  when  information  about  unsound  practices  surfaced, 
clearing-house officials might deliberately ignore the danger signals. The case 
of the Maverick National Bank in Boston (which collapsed as a result of large 
loans to support the speculative investments of  its president, Asa P.  Potter, 
and several of its directors) shows that they could be so worried about finan- 
cial crises that they would rather overlook the transgressions of member banks 
than rock the boat and risk precipitating any failures. Certainly, when Potter’s 
partner, Irving A. Evans, went bankrupt and committed suicide a month be- 
fore the Maverick’s collapse, rumors quickly spread that the bank itself was in 
40. Patten (1896. 357). At the time of the Pacific National failure, Patten was cashier at Bos- 
ton’s State National Bank, a member of the clearing house. On the admission policies of clearing 
houses, see also Carroll (  1895, 132-33).  According to a Manual put out by the Maverick National 
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trouble.  The clearing  house,  however,  took  no  action until  the  Winthrop 
Bank, of  which Evans’s brother was  president, refused to honor one of the 
Maverick’s certified checks. (Potter later claimed that the brother blamed him 
for the suicide and used this means to exact revenge.) Other clearing-house 
members were appalled by the Winthrop’s action, but the cat was now out of 
the bag,  and the association had no choice but to initiate an investigation, 
which culminated with the pronouncement that the Maverick National Bank 
was indeed ins01vent.~’ 
Government regulators also proved to be of  little use to clearing houses in 
controlling the behavior of individual bankers. Although the National Bank- 
ing Acts prohibited loans to any one individual, firm, or corporation in excess 
of  10 percent of  a bank’s capital, this provision was relatively easy to evade 
and difficult to enforce. The only sanction the comptroller of the currency had 
at his disposal was to institute proceedings to revoke the offending bank’s 
charter, a remedy far too drastic to be invoked with any frequency. As a result, 
the statutory limit notwithstanding, over 40 percent of the national banks re- 
porting to the comptroller in June 1900 had made at least one loan that ex- 
ceeded 10 percent of their capital.42  The most the comptroller could do was to 
make regular examinations and communicate the results to the banks’ officers 
and directors. But what the banks did with this information depended mainly 
on the character of  their boards of  directors and the extent to which board 
members exercised any oversight over managers’ decisions. 
5.7  Specialization in Short-Term Commercial Lending 
Thus one solution to the problem of  dangerous banking practices was to 
encourage directors to become more vigilant. Trade journals from the 1880s 
were filled with articles urging directors to pay closer attention to their du- 
ties-to  attend board meetings more frequently, to examine the books of their 
banks with greater regularity, and to “watch the conduct of their president and 
manager.”43  These exhortations, plus a growing tendency for creditors to sue 
the directors of failed banks for negligence, seem to have produced a rise in 
attendance at directors’ meetings. To  return to the original examples, by  1895 
all six directors of the Boylston National Bank of  Boston were present at 80 
percent or more of the meetings, and four were there at least 90 percent of the 
time. Attendance was still low  at the Massachusetts National Bank, but at 
People’s in Roxbury four of  the directors attended at least 70 percent of the 
meetings, as opposed to only one in  1880. To  encourage this trend,  many 
41. Boston Evening Transcript (2 November 1891):l-2, and (3  November 1891):8. 
42. Bankers’ Magazine 37(December 1882):445;  Barrett (1907,289). 
43.  Bankers’  Magazine  36(December  188 1):414-16,  36(April  1882):733-35,  36(June 
1882):892-94,  39(0ctober 1884:241-44,42(August 1887):8 1-84;  42(December 1887):409-13; 
Rhodes’ Journal of  Banking 12(April 1885):259-60. 188  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
banks began to pay  their directors a nominal sum, usually  $2 (sometimes 
more), for each meeting attended.” 
In order for this increased attentiveness to have any consequence, however, 
directors had to be educated about sound banking practices. In addition, there 
had to be a set of agreed-upon standards-particularly  a set of objective cri- 
teria for loans-that  directors could use to monitor managers’ performance. 
In the case of  collateral loans, objective criteria were relatively easy to estab- 
lish,  because  the  securities  markets  provided  an  evaluative  mechanism. 
Hence, the securities of closely held corporations had at all cost to be avoided. 
Because they were not traded on the exchanges, their worth was difficult to 
establish, and this uncertainty made it possible for bank officers to overvalue 
the assets of enterprises with which they themselves were associated. A rash 
of  bank  failures in  the early  1880s dramatically illustrated the dangers in- 
volved: 
The banks which lately failed loaned on very poor security, and other banks 
have lost by  doing the same thing-by  accepting the bonds and stocks of 
incomplete enterprises, and which perhaps were earning no dividends. But 
the saddest feature of the recent disclosures is that bank officers were led to 
do these things because of  their pecuniary interest in the enterprises that 
received the money. They well knew in most of these cases, probably, that 
the securities were of  a hazardous nature. And they never would have ac- 
cepted such securities, except for their own interest in these outside under- 
takings  .45 
Such willful misjudgment was more difficult to guard against in the case of 
unsecured loans, but bankers’ faith in the objective worth of real commercial 
paper helped them to devise another set of lending criteria that they felt would 
obviate the problem. Although they recognized that real commercial paper 
was increasingly scarce, they believed that banks could create an equally ef- 
fective substitute by  restricting their business to short-term loans based on 
quick assets only. We  have already seen how this type of  loan was embraced 
as a solution to the problem of evaluating the creditworthiness of outside bor- 
rowers. That it might also be embraced as a solution to the objectivity problem 
can be seen from a pamphlet by E. T.  Coman, entitled “Requisites of a Good 
Loan.” Like other writers at the time, Coman recommended that banks should 
invest 20 percent of their funds in high-grade bonds and securities and another 
20 percent in commercial paper purchased in the open market. Such invest- 
ments would seem to insure that the banks had enough liquid assets to meet 
most exigencies, yet Coman nonetheless insisted that their remaining loans 
44.  Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1887-1909,  Boylston National Bank; Direc- 
tors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1883-1900,  Massachusetts National Bank; Directors’ and 
Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1883-98,  People’s National Bank. The generalization about remu- 
neration is based on my reading of minute books for a large number of banks in the region. 
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should be based only on borrowers’ “current business,” by  which he meant 
advances on “the market value of  commodities in the process of  conversion 
into money.” If not specified for sixty or ninety days, such loans “should ma- 
ture upon the definite happening of an event which is of reasonable certainty 
of  occurrence . . . , the maturity of  a crop, the completion of  a contract.” 
Loans of  indeterminate length, he suggested, were a recipe for disaster. Es- 
pecially to be avoided were “loans which have the character sf  a permanent 
investment in the business of the borrower” (Coman 1907, 69-71). 
It is clear from the remainder of the pamphlet that the author, who goes on 
to fret about the problem of insider lending, made these recommendations  not 
primarily for the purpose of insuring liquidity, but because he believed that 
they were the best means of insuring that loans would be granted according to 
objective criteria, such that a banker could exercise “no arbitrary discretion 
when he extends or refuses accommodation to the borrower” (ibid., 66). By 
adopting a standard for loans that resembled as closely as possible the ideal of 
real commercial paper, banks could avoid the entanglements between bor- 
rower and lender that distorted the latter’s judgment and  potentially under- 
mined the security of the banking system. 
As Coman’s pamphlet suggested, long-term loans were considered prima 
facie evidence of the existence of  such potentially disastrous entanglements 
between borrowers and lenders. Hence as bankers redefined the boundaries of 
their business during the latter years of the century, they proscribed this type 
of lending entirely. James B. Forgan underscored this point in  1898: “One of 
the most fundamental principles of good banking is that the bank should not 
furnish the capital for its customers to do business upon. The customer should 
possess his own capital, and require assistance from the bank only at certain 
seasons  and  for  specific  purposes”  (Bankers’  Magazine  57[September 
1898]:384). Comptroller of  the Currency Hugh  McCulloch put  the matter 
even more succinctly in a statement that was repeatedly quoted in the practical 
banking literature: “Banks are not loan offices. It is no part of their business 
to furnish their customers with capital” (quoted in Barrett 1907, 305). 
5.8  Theory and Practice 
There is no question that, by  the end of  the century, these principles had 
come to dominate all  discussions in  the  practical banking  literature. But 
whether bank managers in fact adhered to them in their daily business activi- 
ties is much more difficult to determine. There simply are no internal bank 
records from this period that report the actual criteria employed in evaluating 
individual applications for loans. 
That directors did make use of the new rules to monitor the performance of 
their managers is, however, suggested by the records of the National Shawmut 
Bank, the largest bank in Boston, the result of  a merger of ten of  the city’s 
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day basis by an executive committee, whose decisions the board of directors 
assembled weekly to ratify. Each year, however, the board appointed its own 
agents to scrutinize the state of the bank’s loan and investment portfolios. In 
the reports of these examiners, one finds clear evidence that the principles set 
down in the practical banking literature were actually being applied. In 1903, 
for example, the examiners chastised the bank’s managers for accepting as 
collateral securities that were not actively traded on the market: “We disap- 
prove in loaning on the stock of a Corporation where we are loaning direct to 
the Corporation, especially to Officers, except on listed and active and sale- 
able stocks.” The examiners also devoted a significant portion of their report 
to criticizing “the large and apparently permanent Loans to Corporations and 
Individuals which appear like furnishing a steady Capital for business enter- 
prises.” To  reduce the number of  such  loans the  examiners recommended 
“converting a certain class of Time Loans that usually have to be renewed at 
the option of the borrower, and a part of what we call Steady Demand Loans, 
into Loans that when they come due cannot possibly have any claims on the 
Bank.” To  this end they advised the executive committee to make purchases 
“in the open market of Commercial paper and Collateral 
Yet  even if  we grant, as the Shawmut evidence seems to suggest, that these 
new principles were indeed finding their way into everyday banking practice, 
we still need to assess the extent to which they actually shaped loan portfolios. 
Writing in the second decade of  the twentieth century, the economist H. G. 
Moulton attacked the (by then) conventional wisdom of the practical banking 
literature by arguing that banks should play an active role in supporting man- 
ufacturing investment: In order to demonstrate that such a role would not un- 
dermine the safety of the banking system, he undertook to show that a consid- 
erable  portion  of  existing  loans  already  financed  such  investment-that 
“commercial banks are prone to ignore, in practice, the distinction between 
commercial and investment business” (Moulton 19 18, 639). Moulton con- 
ceded that banks decided whether to make unsecured loans by calculating the 
ratio of a firm’s debt obligations to its quick assets. He also admitted that such 
loans were rarely granted for periods longer than six months. But he argued 
that many short-term loans were regularly renewed, and that once a loan was 
granted,  banks had  no control over the use to which the borrower put the 
funds. As a practical matter, the proceeds of a loan could be used just as easily 
to pay  for investments in plant  and equipment as to  finance goods in  the 
stream of production. Based on his own (undescribed) “investigations extend- 
ing over a period of several years,” Moulton claimed that as much as 20 per- 
cent of the banking sector’s unsecured commercial loans were used for invest- 
ment purposes (ibid., 648). 
Moulton’s assertions are difficult to verify, because most of the bank records 
46. Report of the Committee to Examine the Loans and Securities of the Bank, 23 April  1903, 
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that are extant contain only scattered data on loans, with no information at all 
about their terms or about the kinds of security that backed them up. There is, 
however, a brief run of complete loan records for the Suffolk National Bank 
in  Analysis of these records shows that 54 percent of  the bank’s 
portfolio consisted of short-term loans based on personal security, and that it 
is unlikely that many of these loans could have supported investments in plant 
and  equipment. Fully  two-thirds (by  value) were  notes purchased  on the 
commercial-paper market,  that  is,  bought  from  individuals or  firms  that 
served neither as principals nor endorsers for the notes. Although many of the 
signatories on these loans were manufacturers, they were not themselves cus- 
tomers of the bank and hence could not expect their notes to be renewed at 
maturity. In fact, only  19 percent of  the bank’s loan portfolio consisted of 
notes backed by personal security that were discounted for the benefit of cus- 
tomers who were signatories, and less than half of this amount involved man- 
ufacturing enterprises. 
It is, of course, possible that the Suffolk National Bank was unusually spe- 
cialized in the commercial lending business, and that the loan portfolios of 
other institutions would look quite different. But the (much less complete) 
evidence on loans that is available for other banks in Massachusetts  and Rhode 
Island suggests otherwise. The problem with these records is that it is impos- 
sible to distinguish loans to regular customers from short-term commercial 
paper bought in the open market. But a proxy for this distinction can be con- 
structed by assuming that all loans to local firms (that is, loans whose princi- 
pals or endorsers were listed in local city directories) were loans to customers, 
and that all other loans consisted of purchased commercial paper. Such a cal- 
culation reveals that loans to local customers who were manufacturers ranged 
form 0 to at most 20 percent of portfolios, with most banks clustering between 
14 and  20 percent. There is no reason to assume, moreover, that all of  the 
loans in this category supported investments in fixed capital. A large propor- 
tion undoubtedly financed bills re~eivable.~~ 
47. Discount Register, 1899-1902,  vol. 75, Discounted Notes Balance,  1900-1902,  vol. 101, 
Discount Ledger, 1901-2,  vol.  102, Suffolk Bank, Boston, MA, MSS 781, Baker Library, Har- 
vard University Graduate School of  Business Administration.  I analyzed all loans granted in the 
months of January, April, July, and October 1901. 
48. At least some information on loans is available for the following banks: Shoe and Leather 
National Bank of  Boston, 1887; Monument National Bank of Charlestown,  Boston,  1905; Na- 
tional Bank of Rhode Island, Newport, 1888; First National Bank of Warren, RI, 1886; National 
Hope Bank, Warren, RI, 1889; National Warren Bank, RI, 1888  and 1898; National Niantic Bank, 
Westerly, RI, 1893; and First National Bank of Bristol, RI, 1898. See Directors’ and Stockhold- 
ers’ Minute Book, 1885-93,  Shoe and Leather National Bank, Bank of  Boston Archives; loose 
sheets in Directors’ Minute Book, 1892-1905,  Monument National Bank, MSS 781, Baker Li- 
brary, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration.  The remainder of the 
records are located at the Fleet National Bank Archives. See Directors’ Minute Book, 1862-1902, 
National Bank of Rhode Island; Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1864-89,  First Na- 
tional  Bank of  Warren; Directors’  and  Stockholders’  Minute  Book,  1873-92,  National  Hope 
Bank; Directors’ and Stockholders’ Minute Book,  1887-99,  National Warren Bank; Directors’ 
and Stockholders’ Minute Book, 1892-1905,  National Niantic Bank; Directors’ and Stockhold- 
ers’ Minute Book, 1865-1901,  First National Bank of Bristol, RI. 192  Naomi R. Lamoreaux 
It is, of course, true, as Moulton also pointed out, that collateral loans to 
brokers and other intermediaries who dealt in the securities markets could be 
construed as supporting capital formation, because they indirectly underwrote 
the investment activities of the firms that issued the securities in the first place 
(Moulton 1918, 651-54).  Eighty-four percent (by value) of  the Suffolk’s col- 
lateral loans (38 percent of its total portfolio) were of this type. But what is 
interesting about these loans was precisely how indirect the relationship be- 
tween banks and capital  formation was.  Whereas early-nineteenth-century 
banks had  granted large loans to support the  investment activities of  their 
officers and directors, late-nineteenth-century bankers responded to the infor- 
mation problems created by  their arm’s length dealings by  eschewing any- 
thing that smacked of a direct investment in their customers’ enterprises. In- 
stead they insisted that loans backed by  personal security be based on quick 
assets only and that loans backed by  collateral security be based on readily 
marketable securities. In the case of both types of  loans, moreover, bankers 
seem by  the turn of  the century to have preferred increasingly to escape the 
mutual obligations of the customer relationship and do much of their business 
through brokers. Although banks thus relinquished their ability to monitor or 
influence borrowers’ behavior, such specialization enabled them to reduce risk 
by  shifting it  to other kinds of  intermediaries.  As  one banker  fantasized, 
“Some day [I] will have a bank (about the time of the millennium) which will 
. . . make no loans direct, but will only buy notes through the brokers; where 
collateral is used, that will be held by guarantee companies who shall endorse. 
It will thus be  able to stop lending on any name without reflecting on the 
party’s credit” (Rhoda’  Journal of  Banking 20[February 18931: 138-39). 
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Comment  Charles W Calomiris 
Naomi Lamoreaux’s portrayal of  New  England banking emphasizes several 
intriguing features of the changing structure and role of New England’s banks. 
I would call attention to three  major themes in the paper.  (1) In the early 
history of the system “insiders” played a fundamental role in ownership and 
management,  obtained  preferential  treatment  in  access to  funds,  and  ac- 
counted for a large share of bank loans. (2) “Outsiders” (including unsophis- 
ticated investors) during the early history of New England banking were not 
just debt holders (as many historical and theoretical studies of other times and 
places lead one to expect), but in many cases accounted for the majority of 
stock ownership in banks. (3) By  the late nineteenth century the reliance on 
insider ownership and control had waned, insiders were far less important as 
an outlet for bank loans, and financing came to rely less on capital and more 
on debt. 
A central point of Lamoreaux’s paper is that the early financing and loan- 
allocation structures of New England banks should not be studied in isolation; 
they are best understood as a combined response to the need to finance pro- 
ductive local investments in an environment of  “capital scarcity,” given that 
other means for external finance were lacking. Furthermore, she argues that 
the change in bank financing structure and loan allocation over time support 
that view. The decline in the reliance on insider ownership, management, and 
borrowing coincides with an increased reliance on debt, and a change in the 
way banks gathered information about their new primarily “arm’s length” bor- 
rowers. 
What I especially like about this paper is that the evidence it contains helps 
to tie together three important literatures: the theoretical literature on the op- 
timal form of  bank finance in  environments of  asymmetric information, the 
empirical literature on the evolution of banking in the United States, and the 
historical literature on  changing regional concentration of  industrialization 
over the nineteenth century. 
I will discuss how I think these three literatures are linked, using evidence 
presented in the paper and some additional evidence. In doing so, I will (1) 
provide generally supportive descriptive evidence, (2) recast and add to the 
argument linking the peculiarity of the two sides of early New England banks’ 
Charles W.  Calomiris is visiting associate professor of finance at the Wharton School, Univer- 
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balance sheets, and (3) show that-consistent  with the theoretical model I 
will discuss-New  England’s cities during the first half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury were the main outlier with respect to the loan allocations and financing 
structure of U.S. banking. 
Industry and Banks in New England Relative to the United States 
Let me begin with a discussion of  the literature on changes in industrial 
location during the nineteenth century. New England banks (especially those 
in Boston and Providence) initially were an important vehicle for financing 
the golden age of New England industrial growth. As  investment opportuni- 
ties shifted to other regions, New  England’s banks changed their role from 
financing investment to financing commercial activities and investing in se- 
curities. As  is well known, small groups of New England’s entrepreneurs set 
up a complex interlinked network of banks and industrial enterprises during 
the period of  early industrialization. This network was mainly designed to 
help  finance  growing  industry  during  an  early  stage  when  entrepreneurs 
lacked sufficient investment funds. 
The reasons behind the early concentration of industry in New England has 
been the focus of  much research-by  Field, Hekman, Goldin and Sokoloff, 
and many others.’ These authors point to a combination of factors-low-cost 
labor displaced from agriculture as the West opened, and agglomeration econ- 
omies (or Marshallian factor-market externalities) that made Boston an espe- 
cially good  location to  develop new  techniques.  Boston and vicinity was 
where cheap unskilled labor, skilled artisans who could manufacture and ser- 
vice innovative (and changing) machinery, and concentrations of capital could 
all meet and collaborate easily. 
Hekman’s map of  industrial location emphasized the importance of  prox- 
imity to Boston’s factor markets during the early phase of technological de- 
velopment and capital accumulation in cotton textiles.2 He, and later Wright,’ 
argued that the shift of industry away from Boston and toward the South in 
the 1880s and 1890s reflected lower costs of unskilled labor in the South, and 
a mature (and therefore) “transportable” manufacturing technology that no 
longer required proximity to skilled machinists. Factories, entrepreneurs, and 
capital moved South and West in the late nineteenth century as economic op- 
portunities, transportation cost declines, and factor-market price differentials 
propelled them out of the Northeast. It is therefore natural that New England’s 
big-city bankers would change their allocation of  funds more toward com- 
1. Alexander Field, “Sectoral Shift in Antebellum Massachusetts: A Reconsideration,” Explo- 
rations in Economic History  15(1978):146-71;  John S. Hekman, “The Product Cycle and New 
England Textiles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 94( 1980):697-7 17; Claudia Goldin and Ken- 
neth Sokoloff, “Women, Children, and Industrialization in the Early Republic: Evidence from the 
Manufacturing Census,” Journal of Economic History 42( 1982):741-74. 
2. Hekman, “Product Cycle,” fig.  1. 
3. Gavin Wright, “Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles before 1880,” Journal of Economic His- 
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merce  and  more  distant  investments.  Additionally,  as New  England firms 
grew,  their internally generated cash flow  increased relative to their invest- 
ment opportunities, reducing their demands for borrowing. An interesting ex- 
ample of  this turning outward was a propensity of  state-chartered banks in 
New England to invest in western mortgage pools in the latter quarter of the 
century. Gary Gorton and I discovered this while sifting through state bank 
superintendent reports from the 1890s. When the western land bust came, it 
seems New England state-chartered banks were among the hardest hit of east- 
ern state-chartered banks. 
Thus far I have argued that the transition from financing local capital accu- 
mulation to other activities, which Lamoreaux argues occurred, makes sense 
within the overall context of the history of changes in industrial expansion in 
various regions of the United States. But this does not explain why industrial 
entrepreneurs in  New  England during the early nineteenth century should 
have owned and controlled banks, nor why banks in New England cities had 
such higher ratios of capital to assets relative to other banks. 
Before discussing explanations for these unusual aspects of early New En- 
gland banking, it is worth noting that New England’s cities were the exception 
to the rule in their propensities to make so many loans to insiders and to rely 
on capital as their primary means of finance. 
First, on the question of loans to insiders, scattered data that are available 
suggest that states outside New England had much lower proportions of loans 
to insiders. For example,  according to the reports of  the superintendent of 
banking in New York State for 1845, only 6 percent of assets took the form of 
loans to insiders. By  1854 in New York  City loans to directors amounted to 
roughly 4.8 percent of total assets, while for the state as a whole insider loans 
were 4.6 percent of total assets. Many states (Ohio, for example) specifically 
limited loans to insiders, and in many cases 10 percent was considered a large 
number. 
On the question of reliance on capital finance, again New England-and  its 
cities in particular-seems  to be a national outlier. In a recent paper, Kahn 
and I pointed out that New England’s banks had much lower specie ratios and 
much higher capital ratios than other northeastern states’ banks in 1850.4  We 
also found that  these patterns varied greatly by  bank  location within each 
state. Holding urbanization constant, New England and other states have sim- 
ilar reliance on  capital,  except in the large cities (Boston and Providence) 
where the reliance on capital far exceeds that of Baltimore, New York City, or 
Philadelphia. 
Table 5C. 1 draws on data from state superintendents’ reports to compare 
and contrast the financing structure of banks in New York, Massachusetts, and 
Pennsylvania for three dates in the nineteenth century. The essential messages 
4. Charles W.  Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn, “The Efficiency of Cooperative Interbank Re- 
lations: The Suffolk System,” manuscript, Northwestern University, 1990. Table 32.1  Bank Growth and Financing 
1836-37  1854-55  1900” 
NY  PAb  MA  BUS  NY  PAb  MA 
1/37  1/37  10136  1137  9/54  11/54  8/55  NY  PA  MA 
D/A  0.14  0.20  0.22  0.02  0.34  0.24  0.17  0.56  0.62  0.54 
NIA  0.20  0.22  0.16  0.10  0.13  0.34  0.22  0.02  0.04  0.04 
CIA  0.30  0.38  0.51  0.29  0.35  0.26  0.49  0.08  0.12  0.15 
C&SIA  0.35  0.42  0.56  0.34  0.38  -  0.54  0.17  0.23  0.24 
IB/A  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.28  0.09  0.04  0.06  0.23  0.11  0.15 
a  2.2  1.8  1.7  11.0  9.4  5.2 
n  1.4  2.8  2.3  1.3  I .O  I .o 
d  5.4  0.6  1.3  17.9  24.5  16.5 
C  2.6  1.2  1.6  2.6  4.3  1.7 
c&s  2.4  -  1.7  4.9  7.2  2.3 
A  108  62  68  119  237  112  112  2,609  1,053  585 
n/a  0.6  1.6  1.4  0.1  0.1  0.2 
&a  2.5  0.3  0.8  1.6  2.6  3.2 
cia  1.2  0.7  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.3 
c&da  1.1  -  1 .o  0.5  0.8  0.4 
Sources: U.S.  Congress, House, Condition ofBanks throughour rhe Union, 25th Cong.,  1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 111 (1837); U.S. Congress, House, Condition of 
Banks throughout the Unnion, 34th Cong.,  1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 102 (1855); Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics  (Washington, 
Dc,  1959). 
Note:  Lowercase letters denote ratio of  current level to previous period’s levels.  D  = individuals’ deposits; N  = bank notes outstanding;  C  = capital; S = 
surplus;  IB = deposits of other banks; A  = total assets. 
“Data include national and state banks. 
bData  exclude Bank of  the United States (BUS). 
cAssuming  4 percent surplus-to-assets in 1854 (the ratio in 1837). 199  Specialization in Short-term Commercial Lending 
of this table are (1) in 1836 and 1854 Massachusetts banks had a much higher 
reliance on capital to finance assets; (2) from  1836 to  1854 the reliance on 
capital  was  little  changed  in  New  York  or  Massachusetts,  with  balanced 
growth  in  all  financing  components in Massachusetts (in contrast to New 
York’s  increased reliance on deposits, and Pennsylvania’s increased reliance 
on notes); (3) by  1900, all three states had converged to a fairly homogeneous 
financial structure,  with  Massachusetts and Pennsylvania showing an espe- 
cially strong “catching up” in deposit banking. 
But the heavy reliance on capital in  the early phase of  banking growth in 
Massachusetts shown in table 5C.  1 is entirely attributable to Boston. If  Bos- 
ton banks are removed from the sample, the capital ratio of  Massachusetts 
banks falls from 5 1 percent to 33 percent. This is comparable to a 35 percent 
capital ratio of banks in New York state located outside New York City. 
These facts suggest that a theoretical explanation of the reliance of banks 
on capital should explain the peculiarity of  New England’s cities in the early 
period. Another fact that the model should explain is that the greater reliance 
on bank capital did not require higher returns to stock ownership. Indeed, 
dividends for New England banks (in and outside Boston) are lower than those 
of Philadelphia or New York City banks.5 In other words, banks in New En- 
gland were able to float more stock at lower cost than banks elsewhere, while 
at the same time lending more of their money to insiders. 
Modeling Bank Ownership Structure and Financing Structure 
I return now to the two central puzzles of  New England banking to be ex- 
plained-namely,  the high reliance on capital by  banks in Providence and 
Boston, and the relative importance of  loans to insiders (those who own a 
substantial share of the bank and control its operations). 
In explaining the preferential treatment afforded insiders, Lamoreaux dis- 
misses  the argument that outsiders were too costly to screen and  monitor, 
noting first that they were typically part of  the same local community, and 
second,  that  many  outsiders’  loan  applications were  rejected  not  on  the 
grounds of poor credit risk, but because the insiders preferred to lend to them- 
selves and “lay over” the requests of outsiders. Indeed, Lamoreaux argues that 
“one of the primary forces driving the expansion of the banking system in the 
early nineteenth century was the desire to gain privileged access to credit.” In 
other words, part of  the value of  starting a bank was owning a loan supply 
option for your own business. 
This is certainly a reasonable idea, given the potential information prob- 
lems involved in financing growing enterprises through other means than the 
bank (foreign or out-of-state borrowing, direct corporate stock flotations in 
foreign or out-of-state markets, etc.). 
Assuming there was  a credit-supply benefit to  insiders from organizing 
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banks to make loans to them, how does one explain (1) that insiders will hold 
a substantial fraction of the bank (an even larger fraction relative to their own 
wealth) and (2) that outsiders provide a readier market for bank stock than in 
other states, rather than debt, and at lower yields than in other states? This 
second fact seems all the more puzzling given the potential for cheating out- 
siders through fraudulent or excessively risky insider lending. After all, many 
arguments for the prevalence of bank reliance on debt financing under asym- 
metric information view debt as limiting the banker’s behavior to protect the 
interests of the outsider.6 
I think many of  the pieces necessary to make a reasonable argument are 
provided in Lamoreaux’s paper. The argument for why capital was feasible in 
New  England seems to have three parts: (1) small stockholders were given 
disproportionate power in voting as a check on insider abuse (note that the 
fact that this power was not used very often could simply be an indication that 
it was a very effective check); (2) much of bank stock was owned by people in 
the know who were not loan recipients, thus providing a mechanism (through 
stock demand) to keep insiders behaving properly; and (3) insiders or their 
associated enterprises (including savings banks) held substantial amounts of 
bank  stock,  which  would  have been  reduced by  fraudulent or excessively 
risky lending to insiders. 
Thus part of the explanation for why widows and orphans were willing to 
hold bank stock is that enough insiders and sophisticated investors were also 
doing so. Kahn and I make a similar argument for the prevalence of bank stock 
in New  England  at low yields.’  We  argue that institutional peculiarities in 
New  England (notably the Suffolk system) facilitated incentive-compatible 
monitoring  by  informed parties.  A central point  here  is  the old  saw that 
“where there’s no conflict, there’s no interest.” Environments where asymmet- 
ric information is important imply benefits from some subset of  the debt or 
equity holders monitoring the managers. The trick is to provide an incentive 
for the right people to do the right amount of costly monitoring.8 
As nineteenth-century contemporaries and banking historians since Redlich 
have stressed, New England bankers seem to have solved the problem of cre- 
ating incentive-compatible monitoring extraordinarily well. Lamoreaux’s de- 
tailed evidence allows us to speculate more specifically on how incentives for 
monitoring were created. Incentive-compatible monitoring seems to have oc- 
curred at two levels: within the banking firm and among financial institutions. 
In both cases, there were clear gains to be had by relatively informed parties 
in limiting excessive risk-taking by insiders at the expense of outsiders. 
6. Charles W.  Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn, “The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring 
Optimal Banking Arrangements,” American Economic  Review  81(1991):497-513;  Charles W. 
Calomiris, Charles M. Kahn, and Stefan Krasa, “Optimal Contingent Bank Liquidation under 
Moral Hazard,” Federal Reserve Bank of  Chicago Working Paper WP-13  (April 1991). 
7. Calomiris and Kahn, “Efficiency of Cooperative Interbank Relations.” 
8. Described in Calomiris and Kahn, “Role of Demandable Debt”; Calomiris, Kahn, and Krasa, 
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First, at the level of  the banking firm, insiders had incentives to monitor 
each other. Importantly, not all insiders desired funds at any one point in time. 
Insiders who wished access to funds tomorrow would want to preserve the 
solvency and reputation of the bank today. So long as the value to insiders of 
continued access to funds is sufficiently great, insiders will have incentives to 
monitor  one  another and protect the  long-run interests of  the bank.  They 
would not be amenable to side payments from today’s insider borrowers at the 
expense of the bank’s overall health. According to this argument, so long as 
there are several insiders running the bank, they will restrain any one insider’s 
attempt to use the bank as a vehicle to finance an unworthy project. Moreover, 
as  Lamoreaux correctly  argues,  short-term loans can provide an  effective 
means to limit risk taking by  borrowers too, allowing early intervention to 
correct borrowers’ abuses. 
This argument helps to explain the feasibility of New England’s early reli- 
ance on capital. Because the future loan-supply option was so valuable to the 
insiders, they expended the information costs necessary to ensure proper al- 
location of funds. In other states, and in New England by  the late nineteenth 
century, the value of the credit-supply option may not have been as high, and 
thus capital finance and insider lending would not have been accompanied by 
the appropriate degree of monitoring among insiders. 
It is interesting to note that this is precisely the same principle employed by 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh for ensuring that farmers repay government 
Groups of  landless farmers form loan cooperatives, with each farmer 
taking turns at borrowing. The group members’ incentives to screen and mon- 
itor each other depend on the value of the government-subsidized loan-supply 
option, which is conditional on the continuing performance of the previous 
borrowers in the group. If any member of the group defaults, the entire group 
is redlined in the future. Actual default rates on loans are extremely small (1 
percent). 
As both Lamoreaux and Calomiris and Kahn’O emphasize, there was also a 
significant interbank monitoring network at work in New England. The inter- 
lacing of the balance sheets of the savings banks and commercial banks, and 
the interlacing of commercial bank liabilities through the Suffolk system, cre- 
ated strong incentives for banks to regulate each other (as in the Suffolk sys- 
tem) and monitor each other. The gains from doing so for the Suffolk system 
were the joint product of a higher demand for New England bank notes (wider 
circulation at lower rates of discount), while the benefits to the savings banks 
and insurance companies from monitoring followed from their direct invest- 
ments in commercial banks. 
Gorton,  myself,  Schweikart, and Kahn have argued that there are many 
9. See Mahabub Hossain, Credit for  the Rural Poor: The Experience of  the Grameen Bank in 
10. Calomiris and Kahn, “Role of Demandable Debt.” 
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other examples of  successful interbank monitoring to provide a joint benefit, 
including city clearing houses, mutual guarantee systems (in antebellum Ohio 
and  Indiana),  and  branch-banking systems (particularly in the  antebellum 
South).11  What sometimes limited the potential for interbank coordination, 
however, was the number of banks and the geographical dispersion of banks, 
under  unit  banking.  Once  the  number of  potential monitors becomes too 
great, the incentives to invest in information that benefits the group becomes 
too low, because the individual benefit to the monitor is too watered down. 
Moreover, distant banks have a hard time observing each other’s actions, in 
contrast  to  a  small  number  of  branching  banks  whose  locations  overlap 
throughout an area. 
Lamoreaux is somewhat skeptical of the potential for interbank monitoring 
to discipline member banks, based on a few examples of clearing-house fail- 
ures to detect and act upon unsound practices. I think the weight of evidence 
from the studies cited above, and the logic of self-regulation within clearing 
houses, run contrary to her conclusion that “the clearing house was of only 
limited effectiveness as a disciplinary tool .” I conclude from Lamoreaux’s ex- 
amples only that the clearing house, like any good regulatory apparatus, is 
liable to make a few mistakes. A self-regulatory banking system that never 
experiences a bank failure is probably overly restrictive. 
I believe that the peculiarity of New England’s city banks can be attributed 
to  incentive-compatible  monitoring  among  borrower-insiders  and  among 
banks. The feasibility of such monitoring may have been greater in cities for 
two reasons. First, because cities were better areas for entrepreneurs to lo- 
cate,I2 insiders’ loan-supply options may have had higher value. Second, cit- 
ies had a higher concentration of  banks and, therefore, facilitated interbank 
monitoring and discip1ine.l) 
Reduced interbank coordination may be an important element in explaining 
the demise of New England banking’s reliance on capital (along with the re- 
duction at the individual bank level in the value of the loan-supply option). As 
the number of  banks grew, mechanisms for coordinating their behavior be- 
came harder to enforce,  except in cities,  where limited numbers and  geo- 
graphical overlap encouraged the development of city clearing houses. 
11. Gary Gorton, “Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the U.S.,”  Journal of 
Economic History  45( 1985):277-83;  Gary  Gorton, “Self-Regulating Bank  Coalitions,” manu- 
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Conclusion 
To  sum up, the reliance on capital, insider lending, and the ready market 
for bank stock among outsiders were jointly sustainable in New England dur- 
ing the first half of the nineteenth century primarily because opportunities for 
entrepreneurs were great, and institutional relations among financial institu- 
tions provided interbank discipline. As opportunities waned, and perhaps as 
institutional discipline became more costly, banks increasingly turned to other 
more typical means of  solving agency problems, which included a greater 
reliance on demandable debt. 
As Lamoreaux shows, this transformation coincided with  a reduction in 
insider lending,  less direct involvement of  directors in bank affairs (hence, 
less conflict and less interest), and the development of credit evaluation tech- 
niques once outsiders became more important as a source of loan demand.  l4  It 
also coincided with a move toward greater diversification and a preference for 
mark-to-market portfolios, which would have been less desirable when banks 
were financing insiders. 
This paper has added greatly to my understanding of the information prob- 
lems and special early opportunities that underlay the unusual balance-sheet 
and financial-returns data for New England relative to other regions. I hope in 
the future we can convince Lamoreaux to provide a similarly detailed look at 
other regions. It would be particularly interesting to date the increasing in- 
volvement of New York City and Philadelphia banks in the securities markets 
(which I would guess becomes pronounced in the 1850s), and to see how this 
affected (if at all) the structure of bank balance sheets. 
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